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1 Introduction 
 
Every four years, the presidential elections of the United States attract attention from all 
around the world. In 2020, the time of the elections has come again.  Depending on the 
results of the American elections, the foreign policy strategies of one of the world’s 
most powerful nations may change course. Among other key issues, the outcome of the 
elections has an impact on transatlantic relations. In order to better understand the 
current state and future of the transatlantic relations, one can look back in history. 
 
In the 20th century, transatlantic relations were characterized by two World Wars and an 
enduring Cold War rivalry. The end of the Cold War marked an end to the bipolar world 
order and thus a start for increasing polarization of the foreign policy views between the 
American parties (Mead, 2001). Over time, plenty of research has been conducted on 
the evolving transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era.1  However, previous 
studies on transatlantic relations have failed to take partisan aspects into account. In this 
thesis, the focus is not on the role of the administration but on the role of the party 
machines. 
 
This paper aims to reveal the differences between the party platforms of the United 
States’ Democrats and Republicans with regards to what kind of image they construct of 
Europe. The time frame is the post-Cold War era, starting from the 1992 presidential 
elections and ending at the 2016 elections.  All 14 party platforms from seven 
presidential elections were chosen as the data of this study because they are the most 
important documents that the political parties produce. 
 
For a long time the focus of elections research has remained on the candidate level. 
Candidate speeches and TV-debates have acquired national and academic attention, 
while the party platforms have been cast the role of the wallflower. There is only a 
limited amount of research about the contents of the party platforms, and no previous 
 
1 Including Duffield, 2001; Peterson and Pollack (eds.), 2003; Steffenson, 2005; Forsberg and Herd, 
2006; Toje, 2008; Baker, 2009; Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2010; Smith, 2011; Cohen, 2013; Sestanovich, 
2014; and Haass, 2017. 
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research about the way Europe is addressed in them. Therefore, the chosen time frame 
and data provide a topical and unique perspective into transatlantic relations. 
 
On one hand, it is interesting to compare the party platforms of the respective parties 
from the perspective of time to find out if any ideological change can be detected within 
a party. On the other hand, a comparison between the two parties is relevant because it 
reveals the ideological differences between them. Thus, the main research questions of 
the thesis are:  
1. How and why do the Democrats’ and the Republicans’ policies towards Europe 
change over time? 
2. How and why do the policies towards Europe differ between the Democrats and 
the Republicans? 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that both intraparty and interparty ideological change can 
be discovered in the party platforms through analyzing them. First, it is to be expected 
that the developments of domestic and international politics will affect the policies and 
ideological tones of the respective parties over time. Second, it is assumed that the 
parties will concentrate on slightly different issues, events, and actors when referring to 
Europe. The Democratic party is more likely to highlight soft policy issues like social 
policy and climate change, whereas the Republican party may focus more on hard 
policy like defense and military actions. Third, should the party platforms raise virtually 
similar issues, events, and actors, it is anticipated that because of their ideological 
differences, the two parties should have differing or even opposing moral evaluations of 
and treatment recommendations for them. 
 
The method used in the thesis is qualitative content analysis, QCA (Schreier, 2012). 
Following the tradition of QCA, the results of the analysis are presented in both 
qualitative and quantitative ways. Though the analysis is mainly data-driven, the party 
platforms will be analyzed in light of the theoretical framework as well. The theoretical 
background of the thesis is based on Peter Hayes Gries’ (2014) study on conservatives’ 
and liberals’ interparty and intraparty ideological differences over foreign policy. Gries 
has identified two foreign policy profiles among the Republicans, and three foreign 
policy profiles among the Democrats. In this master’s thesis, the aim is to recognize 
these distinct ideological foreign policy profiles in the party platforms. 
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The master’s thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter consists of three parts: 
research about party polarization, introduction of traditional American schools of 
foreign policy, and a theoretical framework of partisan ideological differences over 
foreign policy. The third chapter investigates the data that will be analyzed, the party 
platforms. Previous research about party platforms is presented, and the process of the 
platform writing is explained. The fourth chapter presents the nature and steps of the 
qualitative content analysis method. In the fifth chapter, qualitative content analysis is 
used to reveal the differences between the party platforms with regards to what kind of 
image they construct of Europe. After that, the research results will be discussed in the 
sixth chapter. Finally, conclusions about the results are drawn in the seventh chapter. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, Europe means everything that is located within the 
geographical borders of the continent. In addition, international institutions with most 
member states coming from Europe, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO and the Group of Seven G-7, are included in the analysis.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical background of this thesis is laid out. The first section is 
about general party polarization in American politics in the post-Cold War era. The 
second section shifts the focus to foreign policy. Traditional schools of American 
foreign policy are presented. Finally, the third section displays ideological differences 
over foreign policy both between and within Democratic and Republican parties.  
 
2.1 Party Polarization in American Politics 
 
The theoretical background of the thesis is related to the two research questions. First, 
previous research is used to provide some structure for the analysis of the first research 
question: How do the Democrats’ and the Republicans’ images of Europe change over 
time? This is because the dominant ideology within a party can change over time, due to 
internal power struggles or external incidents or other events. Second, previous research 
is used to explain the differences between the parties’ images of Europe, to answer the 
“why” in the second research question: How and why do the images of Europe differ 
between the Democrats and the Republicans? 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to the dominant Cold War consensus in the 
American foreign policy (Mead, 2001). The bottom line of the foreign policy had been 
the same for both Democrats and Republicans from the 1940s to the 1980s: fight against 
communism on all fronts. Since the immediate threat to the safety of Americans was 
gone with the Soviet Union, American politicians could finally openly ask why the 
United States should expose itself to the costs and risks of interventions overseas 
(Entman 2004, 95-96). It is worth investigating whether this fundamental shift in 
American foreign policy has impacted transatlantic relations as well. 
 
2.1.1 General Causes for Party Polarization 
 
Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) and Frymer (2011) are among many scholars who argue 
that party polarization has increased and the number of moderates in the Congress has 
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declined since the 1970s. At the same time, the parties have become more ideologically 
homogenous. The Democratic party has drifted more towards liberalism and dovish 
foreign policy, whereas the Republican party has become more conservative and 
hawkish in foreign policy. Jeong and Quirk (2019) have investigated the intra-party 
differences in the Congress in more detail. They argue that in the Republican party, the 
most conservative and hawkish, so-called “Gingrich Republicans”, have taken over the 
seats from more moderate Republicans. In the ranks of the Democrats the number of the 
conservative “Southern Democrats” has declined. As a result, the Democratic party has 
drifted ideologically towards liberalism. 
 
Scholars present many causes that have fueled the general trend of party polarization 
between Democrats and Republicans in the US. Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) argue 
that the parties have drifted further apart from each other in the regional perspective. 
The coastlines and Northeast with their big cities and multi-ethnic population have 
become mainly liberal and Democratic. On the other hand, the South, the Mountain 
West, as well as increasingly the Mid-West with its rural areas, declining industry 
towns, and white population have become conservative and Republican. 
 
Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) and Frymer (2011) point out four institutional causes 
for this regional gap. First, the scholars claim that partisan gerrymandering has led to 
more homogenous constituencies and safe seats for one party in the elections. This 
means that the more moderate candidates no longer succeed in the elections because 
there is no incentive to try to apply to a “median voter”. Second, Frymer (2011) argues 
that polarization has increased because closed primaries are becoming more common. It 
means that only registered members of a party can choose their party’s candidate for the 
general election. He claims that the closed primaries enable the more radical party 
activists to have an unequal say because the primary candidates will have to try and 
appeal to them and not to the more moderate public. 
 
Third, Frymer (2011) argues that reforms of the campaign finance laws have 
contributed to party polarization. Legislation has given more opportunities for “one 
cause” interest groups and Political Action Committees to direct money to candidates 
with more extreme opinions. Fourth, Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) and Frymer (2011) 
argue that partisan national broadcasting has played a role in polarization, as well. Fox 
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News on the conservative side and MSNBC on the liberal side provide biased 
information to their separate audiences. The development of social media has further 
created walls between different news realities. 
 
2.1.2 Party Polarization in Foreign Policy 
 
There is no scholarly consensus on whether party polarization is apparent in foreign 
policy. Some scholars argue that the traditional saying “Politics stops at water’s edge” 
applied to American foreign policy to some degree until the end of the Cold War (e.g. 
Jeong & Quirk, 2019). Another traditional theory was the “two presidencies” theory 
(e.g. Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007), which entails that in domestic policy, party 
polarization prevails. As a contrast, the theory claims that in foreign policy, there is a 
bipartisan consensus behind the president. However, most scholars disagree with the 
two presidencies theory. They argue that party polarization has become part of 
American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007; Hurst 
& Wroe 2016, Jeong & Quirk, 2019). 
 
Jeong and Quirk (2019) have contributed to polarization research by providing three 
causes for party polarization over foreign policy. First, they claim that some major 
events in foreign policy have triggered rise in polarization. Among them were the end of 
the Cold War and the Iraq War. Second, they argue that general ideological polarization 
between liberalism and conservatism in domestic politics is reflected in foreign policy, 
as well. Third, they found that tight electoral rivalry has caused polarization both in 
domestic and in foreign policy. Members of Congress were likely to support their co-
partisan president in matters of foreign policy because they thought that the success of 
the president would help their electoral success. Vice versa, members from the opposing 
party were likely to object the policies of the president who was from the opposing 
party. The narrower the margin of the majority in a chamber, the more polarized the 
politicians were along their party lines. 
 
Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) investigated the trend of party polarization in foreign 
policy. They provide an outlook on the US Congress’ foreign policy stands from the 
1930s to 2007. Their main focus is in the post-Cold War era. As a background, they 
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argue that liberal internationalism is what they call the dominant Cold War era ideology 
behind America foreign policy. They argue that during the Cold War, there was 
bipartisan consensus over the combined use of power and over international 
cooperation. They claim that after the Cold War, the absence of an equal counterpower 
led to disarray in American foreign policy. In a unipolar world, there was more room for 
polarization over American foreign policy. As a result, they argue that Democrats ended 
up favoring multilateral partnership policy, whereas the Republicans preferred unilateral 
use of power. 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, polarization over foreign policy increased 
rapidly and continued to do so throughout the 1990s. The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
momentarily brought the parties closer together in 2001. However, the 2003 Iraq War 
returned the growing cleavage between the parties. Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) 
argue that the war on terrorism could not bring such lasting national unity as the Cold 
War did because the nature of the enemy was so different. They claim that fighting 
terrorism consists mainly of undercover operations and intelligence, the aim of which is 
to prevent attacks from happening in the first place. The Cold War, on the other hand, 
presented a hostile expansionist superpower that inspired national mobilization in the 
fight against it. 
 
Kupchan and Trubowitz have revisited their argument on the demise of liberal 
internationalism in their 2010 article. They counter the argument that the election of 
President Obama has brought liberal internationalism back as the dominant ideology in 
American foreign policy. They argue that even though there are such traits in the 
foreign policy of the Obama administration, the party polarization over foreign policy is 
alive and well. This is demonstrated in the Republican party’s strong opposition of the 
actions of the administration. Finally, the two scholars predict that support for active 
international engagement is likely to reduce over time, and that a new rise of 
isolationism will take place in American foreign policy. 
 
Hurst and Wroe (2016) inspect the same time period as Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) 
in their analysis of American foreign policy, namely the Cold War and post-Cold War 
era. Hurst and Wroe (2016) use the House of Representatives’ roll-call votes on foreign 
policy from 1970 to 2012 as their data. They accuse Kupchan and Trubowitz (2007) of 
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presenting a too simplistic trend of an ever-widening polarization since the 1970s. 
Instead, Hurst and Wroe (2016) argue that no clearly increasing trend of party 
polarization in foreign policy can be found. According to them, the issue is more 
complex: there have been cycles with more and less polarization. 
 
However, Hurst and Wroe (2016) admit that party polarization over foreign policy has 
increased starting from the 1994 midterm elections when Republicans took over the 
Congress and Democrat Clinton was president. Yet, they argue that the variation in the 
levels of polarization during the Clinton and Bush presidencies would require more 
thorough inspection. Finally, they claim that at the beginning of President Obama’s 
term, there was a nudge towards more bipartisanship. Nonetheless, the polarization 
started to increase again towards the end of his first term. 
 
2.2 The Traditional American Schools of Foreign Policy 
 
The theoretical background for this thesis is based on Mead’s (2001) categorization of 
four different schools in the American foreign policy: The Hamiltonian, the Wilsonian, 
the Jeffersonian, and the Jacksonian schools. Even though these schools originate from 
the 19th or early 20th century, Mead argues that they are well-suited to characterize the 
major American foreign policy orientations in the post-Cold War era. 
 
2.2.1 From the “Cold War Dichotomy” to the Four Schools of 
Foreign Policy 
 
Mead (2001) argues that between 1949 and 1989, there was a broad, general consensus 
about foreign policy in the United States: communism was a threat to the American 
interests and way of living, and therefore it should be contained. However, there were 
two different approaches in the more specific policies on how to deal with communism. 
The opposing ends of the foreign policy scale were the “realist hawks” and “idealist 
doves” (Mead 2001, 264-265). 
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The realist hawks preferred a strong military and a more aggressive approach to 
combatting communism. If required for the common security, the United States should 
take unilateral military action. Of the four traditional foreign policy schools, the 
Jacksonians and the Hamiltonians were the ones in favor of the realist policies. The 
idealist doves, on the other hand, favored multilateralism over unilateralism and 
economic aid over military aid. The doves argued that the US should provide an 
example of a superior political and economic system that all other countries in the world 
would want to follow. The Wilsonian and Jeffersonian schools leaned towards the 
idealist wing. 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the battle between capitalism and 
communism. The bipolar world order that had dictated the leading paradigm of the 
American foreign policy was history. The new, more complex arena of international 
politics opened up more options for foreign policy views and thus challenged the 
existing dichotomy between hawks and doves. Mead argues that new, arising 
challenges, such as trade issues, divided the two traditional camps into fractions (2001, 
266). 
 
The Jacksonians and the Hamiltonians had been hawks on the unilateral side, and the 
Wilsonians and Jeffersonians had been doves on the multilateral side. Suddenly, 
constant American activism against international communism was no longer needed. 
The foreign policy lines could no longer be drawn just between a unilateral and a 
multilateral foreign policy. A new division was created between internationalism and 
nationalism. If American security was no longer threatened, why should American 
soldiers risk their lives in combat on the other side of the world? Jacksonians and 
Jeffersonians took the nationalist side in the debate. Hamiltonians and Wilsonians, on 
the other hand, saw a chance in creating a new world order based on American interests 
and values. They chose the more internationalist approach. 
 
In what follows, the four schools of foreign policy will be presented with regards to 
their ideas about the post-Cold War world order. First, the ideologies of the 
internationalist wing, the Hamiltonians and Wilsonians, are introduced. Then, the core 
ideas of the nationalists, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, are represented. The table below 
gives an impression about the specialties of the four schools (the table was modified 
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from the version of professor Kari Möttölä). In the table, the schools are represented on 
a two-dimensional axis. The first dimension is the external orientation (internationalism 
vs nationalism). The second dimension is the strive for international political change 
(passivism vs activism). 
 
Table 1. The four schools of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. 
 
Strive for 
international           
political change 
            
 
External  
orientation  
 
 Passivism 
 
Doubt in and  
restraint to 
international political 
change 
 
  Activism 
 
Trust in and strive for 
international political 
change through 
interventions 
 
Internationalism 
 
 
(1) Regular participation 
in international affairs;  
(2) including commitment 
to multilateral order 
 
 
(1) Passive              
internationalism 
 
Hamiltonian 
 
Unilateralism 
Great power centricity 
Carrot = stick 
Interests > values 
 
 
(2) Active 
internationalism 
 
Wilsonian 
 
Multilateralism  
Institutionalism 
Carrot > stick 
Interests < values 
 
Nationalism 
 
(3) Restraint in 
international 
participation; 
(4) or targeted influence 
without permanent 
commitments  
 
 
(3) Passive 
nationalism  
 
Jeffersonian 
 
Isolationism 
Neo-sovereigntism 
Carrot ≠ stick 
Interests < values 
 
(4) Active 
nationalism 
 
Jacksonian 
 
Unilateralism 
Neo-conservatism 
Carrot < stick 
Interests = values 
 
 
Characteristics of the schools: mix of structural and institutional approaches to 
influencing the external milieu; relation between persuasion and coercion as means of 
power; prioritization between American economic/security interests and American 
values in the promotion of US goals. 
(Table modified from the version created by professor Kari Möttölä, University of 
Helsinki: Schools of thought in external grand strategy for the United States: 
historical-ideational identification (as in Mead, 2001).) 
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2.2.2 The Internationalists 
 
The internationalists (the Hamiltonians and Wilsonians) saw the end of the Cold War as 
a chance for the United States to build a “new world order” (Mead 2001, 268). 
However, they have differing ideals about the perfect world and the United States’ role 
in it. The Hamiltonians favor economics and the American unilateralism, whereas the 
Wilsonians give more value to the humanitarian aspects and multilateralism. 
 
The corner stones of the Hamiltonian school are open trade, fiscal responsibility, and 
liberal finance (Mead 2001, 270). After the Cold War, the Hamiltonians wanted to 
create a world based on the American model of capitalism and system of free trade. The 
United States would be the driving force for creating suitable platforms to make this 
possible. Global economic institutions like the World Trade Organization, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would play a key role together with 
regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). 
 
However, the Hamiltonians faced opposition from both Wilsonians and the nationalists: 
The Wilsonians thought that the Hamiltonians sacrificed environmental and 
humanitarian values together with the wages and jobs of American people on the altar 
of free trade. The nationalists claimed that the American standards of living suffered a 
moral sellout to countries with cheaper labor costs. Even though the Hamiltonian trade 
agenda resulted in cheaper goods for customers, the representatives of the more 
nationalist and protectionist schools thought the US should secure its own 
manufacturing sector better (Mead 2001, 270-280). 
 
Whereas the Hamiltonians focused on the economy of the new world order, the 
Wilsonian agenda was based on establishing democratic regimes around the world. 
Assisting former Soviet states and satellites in their transition to a more Western 
democracy was the main goal of the Wilsonians. Furthermore, they wanted to secure the 
democratic peace by strengthening international institutions and law. The Wilsonians 
thought that multilateral political institutions like the United Nations should be the 
leading actors in forming international, environmental and humanitarian agreements 
(Mead 2001, 282-284). 
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The other internationalists, the Hamiltonians, opposed the Wilsonian strive for 
multilateral political institutions. The Hamiltonians thought that giving too much power 
to multilateral political institutions like the UN would pose a risk to the American 
sovereignty. In the eyes of the opposing schools, another problem of the Wilsonian 
school was that they wanted the United States to defend human rights of people around 
the world by protecting them from cruel dictators or in the most horrible cases even 
from genocide through humanitarian interventions. The nationalists (Jeffersonians and 
Jacksonians) disagreed because they did not want to risk any American lives for 
something that did not directly threaten the United States. Even the Hamiltonians 
thought that humanitarian intervention was too much, and that the US should only show 
internationalism on the economic sector by promoting free trade.  
 
2.2.3 The Nationalists 
 
The nationalists saw the end of the Cold War as a chance for the United States to reduce 
its international commitments (Mead 2001, 268-269). They wanted to make sure that 
the interests of American people came first. They did not support increasing the 
American presence in the world or creating a “new world order”. The two nationalist 
schools were the Jeffersonians and the Jacksonians. 
 
The Jeffersonian ideology is the most isolationist and passive of all the four schools. 
Jeffersonians want to end or at least scale down all American overseas economic, 
political and military commitments. As a result, the budget of the army could be cut 
back heavily. The Hamiltonian free trade agenda is a nightmare for the Jeffersonians 
because it hurts American manufacturing and leads to falling wages and jobs being 
transported overseas. The Jeffersonians are in favor of a highly protectionist economy 
and a return to traditional American values (Mead 2001, 271-272, 297). 
 
The Jacksonians share a sense of isolationism with the Jeffersonians to the point that 
they are willing to reduce all economic and political commitments of the US abroad. 
However, Jacksonians support a strong American military that is prepared to protect the 
US security in all possible ways. They are even willing to use military interventions 
overseas but only in case of a threat to the American people. In contrast to Wilsonians, a 
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humanitarian crisis is not alone a sufficient reason for Jacksonians to send American 
troops abroad (Mead 2001, 298-300). 
 
2.3 Ideological Differences over Foreign Policy between and within the 
American Parties 
 
While Mead’s four traditional schools of foreign policy are one step away from the 
Cold War dichotomy, that theory is not best suited for the analysis of party ideologies. 
After all, his thesis focuses on party polices towards Europe, and the data does not 
provide a comprehensive outlook on American foreign policy. Therefore, a more 
detailed theory over ideological differences within and between the parties is presented 
in this section.  
 
As in all fields of politics, liberals and conservatives have differing ideological views on 
foreign policy. According to Peter Hayes Gries, the main ideological difference in 
foreign policy lies in the juxtaposition of internationalism and idealism on one side, 
against nationalism and realism on the other side (2014, 99). Under the umbrellas of 
these two main categories, Gries has investigated the ideological differences in more 
detail and listed seven more specific foreign policy orientations. The seven different 
foreign policy orientations, listed under the concepts of internationalism/idealism and 
nationalism/realism, are: 
 
Internationalism and idealism 
1. Multilateralism 
2. Humanitarianism 
3. Political idealism 
4. Religious idealism 
Nationalism and realism 
5. Isolationism 
6. Military force 
7. Nationalism 
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Internationalism and idealism in the context of foreign policy mean belief in 
international institutions, diplomacy, development aid and humanitarian interventions. 
What is more, internationalism can be understood as eagerness to achieve international 
change for example by promoting democracy or protecting people against religious 
persecution. To sum up, Gries argues that the four foreign policy orientations under 
internationalism and idealism gain more support among the liberals: multilateralism, 
humanitarianism, political idealism, and religious idealism (2014, 99). 
 
Conservatives, on the other hand, are generally more nationalistic and realist than 
liberals, says Gries (2014, 99). They want the United States to act unilaterally rather 
than to follow the rules of international institutions. What is more, they prefer the US to 
keep to themselves and not to engage in international activities unless the national 
security is threatened. If the situation demands action, conservatives believe in security 
through power, and in use of military might instead of diplomacy. Finally, conservatives 
tend to be more nationalist than liberals. Gries does not limit nationalism to patriotism, 
namely the love of the home country. He argues that in this context, nationalism means 
the belief in American superiority over any other nation. To conclude, Gries argues that 
out of the seven foreign policy orientations the most common among conservatives are 
isolationism, use of military force, and nationalism (2014, 99). 
 
However, the ideological division between conservatives and liberals in foreign policy 
is not so clean-cut as the generalizations suggest. In his research, Gries has found out 
that there are divisions both between and within the conservative and liberal groups. 
Focusing on political elites, Gries lays out the intraparty foreign policy differences in 
the Republican and Democratic parties. According to him, there are two foreign policy 
profiles among the Republicans, and three foreign policy profiles among the Democrats. 
In what follows, the main characteristics of these five profiles are presented. 
 
2.3.1 Republican Foreign Policy Profiles 
 
Within the Republican party, Gries argues that there are two main kinds of foreign 
policy profiles: the “Cautious Idealists” and the “Isolationist Skeptics” (2014, 124-125). 
Characteristics that apply to all Republicans, both Cautious Idealists and Isolationist 
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Skeptics, are the belief in American supremacy over other nations, eagerness to use 
military force and preferring American unilateralism as opposed to supporting 
multilateral institutions. 
 
Most of the Republicans are Cautious Idealists: two out of three Republicans belong to 
this category. Their priorities in foreign policy are Nationalism, Military force, 
Religious idealism, Political idealism, and Humanitarianism. Hence, they are willing to 
engage in international activities beyond protecting American national security. 
Promoting democracy and protecting fellow Christians and Jews against persecution are 
typical goals for Cautious Idealist Republicans, to name a few. However, these goals are 
frequently justified with a nationalist undertone. 
 
The other group, Isolationist Skeptics, constitutes the remaining one-third of the 
Republicans. The main difference between the two Republican groups is the degree of 
isolationism. As their name suggests, Isolationist Skeptics would only act abroad if the 
national security is threatened. Moreover, the Isolationist Skeptics are more hostile 
towards multilateral international institutions than the Cautious Idealists. 
 
Table 2. Republican Foreign Policy Profiles and their Policy Orientations. 
Meaning of the 
colors 
High scores in this 
orientation 
Medium scores in this 
orientation 
Low scores in this 
orientation 
 
Republican Foreign Policy Profiles 64% Cautious Idealists 36% Isolationist Skeptics 
Isolationism   
Multilateralism   
Military force   
Humanitarianism   
Political idealism   
Religious idealism   
Nationalism   
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2.3.2 Democratic Foreign Policy Profiles 
 
There are significant foreign policy divisions within the Democratic party as well. In the 
Democratic party, Gries argues that there are three main kinds of foreign policy profiles: 
the “Forceful Idealists”, the “Global Citizens”, and the “Skeptics” (2014, 125-127). The 
members of the Democratic party are almost evenly divided between these three groups. 
The largest group, Forceful Idealists, constitutes 38% of the party members. Global 
Citizens make up 34% and Skeptics the remaining 28% of the party members. 
 
Out of the three profiles, the Forceful Idealists are the most internationally oriented and 
active group. They have high scores in all foreign policy orientations except one: 
isolationism. The rest of the orientations are all almost equally much valued among the 
Forceful Idealists: Humanitarianism has the highest score, but right at its tails are 
Military Force, Nationalism, Multilateralism, Religious Idealism, and Political Idealism. 
Gries describes them as “humanitarian hawks” because they are interested in advancing 
democracy and protecting human rights abroad but are willing to use military force to 
achieve these goals. 
 
The second largest group, Global Citizens, differs from Forceful Idealists most when it 
comes to nationalism and use of military force. The Forceful Idealists score high in 
these orientations, whereas the Global Citizens are significantly less nationalist and 
more reluctant to use military force. Global Citizens have the highest scores in 
humanitarianism and multilateralism, but political and religious idealism are not far 
behind. 
 
The smallest group among Democratic foreign policy profiles is called the Skeptics. 
The most important thing that sets the Skeptics apart from the two other Democratic 
foreign policy orientations is that they are the only isolationist group in the Democratic 
party. They resemble the Republican group Isolationist Skeptics in many aspects: they 
both favor nationalism, military force and isolationism more than the other groups. 
However, there is one significant difference that separates the two: The Democratic 
Skeptics believe more in multilateralism than their Republican equivalents. 
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Table 3. Democratic Foreign Policy Profiles and their Policy Orientations. 
Meaning of the 
colors 
High scores in this 
orientation 
Medium scores in this 
orientation 
Low scores in this 
orientation 
 
Democratic Foreign Policy Profiles 38% Forceful 
Idealists 
34% Global 
Citizens 
28% Skeptics 
Isolationism    
Multilateralism    
Military force    
Humanitarianism    
Political idealism    
Religious idealism    
Nationalism    
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3 Previous Research about Party Platforms 
 
The primary data for this paper are the Democratic and Republican party platforms of 
the American presidential elections in the post-Cold War era (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2012, and 2016). Party platforms are policy papers in which the parties take 
stance on all the issues that the president and the federal government have a mandate to 
decide on. The focus of the platforms is usually on domestic politics, but the parties also 
discuss foreign politics to some degree. The platforms are written by the party officials 
and published in the party’s national convention. The 14 party platforms are available 
online on the webpage of the American Presidency Project (retrieved on September 2, 
2016). 
 
Party platforms, also known as manifestoes, are the general programs of the parties. In 
the US, party platforms are published every four years as part of presidential election 
campaigns. The publication takes place in the respective parties’ national conventions in 
late summer. In the conventions, the presidential candidates are officially nominated for 
the general election. The attention of the media and the public is usually drawn to the 
speeches held at the convention. The acceptance speech of the party’s presidential 
nominee is considered the most important event of the convention nowadays (Disalvo 
and Ceaser, 2016). 
 
Despite the public interest towards candidate speeches and TV-debates between the 
presidential nominees, this thesis does not extend its scope of data to them. This 
demarcation was made because the focus of this paper is on the partisan and not on the 
candidate level. Moreover, a variety of issues are handled in the party platforms but 
only few of them make it to the campaign speeches (Words not spoken, 2012).  Because 
transatlantic relations have no longer been a priority of the American presidential 
elections in the last few decades, the topic has not been raised as often in speeches and 
TV-debates. Because the party platforms contain the ideological principles of the parties 
and cover all policies the parties deem appropriate, they provide more information about 
the Euro-American relations than the speeches or TV-debates would. Finally, party 
platforms are not as frequently used data in academic research. Thus, they provide a 
unique perspective to transatlantic relations. 
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This chapter begins with a debate on whether the party platforms are relevant 
documents at all. Second, previous research about ideological differences in the party 
platforms is represented. Most of the research on party platforms is about general 
liberal-conservative ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans. 
However, scholars disagree about the degree of ideological polarization in the 
platforms. Third, the process of how the party platforms are written is described. 
 
3.1 The Relevance of Party Platforms 
 
Scholars disagree on the importance of party platforms. This section first explains why 
some scholars claim that party platforms do not matter. After that, counterarguments are 
provided. There are scholars who acknowledge the shortcomings of party platforms but 
still claim that party platforms are worth researching. 
 
Maisel (1994) describes the dilemma in his article about candidate centered party 
platforms. On one hand, party platforms are the most essential documents of a party. 
They contain the party’s values, visions, and political agendas. What is said in the 
platforms is what the electorate can expect the party to do when elected. On the other 
hand, Maisel characterizes party platforms as “worthless pieces of paper” (Maisel 1994, 
671). He points out that because the platforms are not binding, they can contain empty 
promises. What is more, Maisel and many political journalists argue that most people 
will never read the party platforms. A case in point is the Republican 1996 presidential 
candidate Bob Dole who famously said that he had never read the party platform and 
never would (Azari & Engel, 2007). 
 
Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) agree with Maisel (1994) that the party platforms, once 
centerpieces of a party’s presidential campaign, have lost their significance over time. 
They provide three reasons for this development: the method of selecting the 
presidential nominees, the changed relationship between the presidential candidate and 
their party, and the development of communications technology. 
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First, the introduction of primary elections in the 1970s changed the dynamics of 
parties’ national conventions. Until then, the battles between the candidates had taken 
place in the national convention. As a result, the convention had been the forum for 
heated debates over the contents of the party platforms. Since the 1970s, primaries and 
caucuses replaced the national convention as the main contest arena. The candidates and 
their campaigns shifted focus from the party activists of the national convention to the 
larger mass of primary voters. The national convention simply became the forum where 
the results of the primaries were registered and the official nomination to general 
elections took place. 
 
Second, the relationship between the party and the nominee changed. Previously, the 
party platform had dictated the agenda for the presidential campaign. The nominee was 
expected to agree on and to promote the policies of the party platform written by the 
party machine. As a result of the primary elections, the relationship turned the other way 
around: the party platform became a product of the victorious candidate. In the 
primaries, the winning candidate had gathered the most delegates to the national 
convention. Therefore, the contents of the party platform were dictated by the staff of 
the victorious candidate and could not be challenged by others. The party platform had 
become a “candidate platform” (Disalvo & Ceaser, 2016; Maisel, 1994). 
 
Third, the transformation of media has shifted the focus from party platforms to 
candidate speeches. Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) argue that in the era of national 
broadcasting television and unlimited Internet access, the elections have become more 
and more candidate centered. As a result, the primary campaigns, TV-debates, and the 
presidential nominees’ acceptance speeches have become the main targets of people’s 
attention. Whereas the contents of a party platform used to define the substance of the 
general elections campaign in the past, the acceptance speech is considered to play that 
role today. Even if there were to be differences between the party platform and the 
acceptance speech, the public’s attention would be on the contents of the speech. 
Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) conclude that nowadays, the purpose of the national 
convention is to provide the setting and audience to the nominee’s acceptance speech. 
The party platform has been reduced to a mere side-product. 
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However, political scientists agree on three situations where the party platforms can be 
beneficial. First, party platforms are useful when the goal is to compare the parties and 
their agendas with each other (Maisel, 1994; Khimm, 2012). After all, party platforms 
are the most important documents that the parties produce. They contain the principles 
and priorities of the parties’ policies. Second, the platforms can reflect the internal 
debates and ideological change within a party over time (Khimm, 2012; Disalvo & 
Ceaser, 2016; Stein, 2016). Through analyzing the platforms, it is possible to learn 
about the internal dynamics and changes in the priorities of the parties’ policies. Third, 
platforms are promises (Azari & Engel, 2007; Payne, 2013). Party platforms create 
expectations about future policies, and they can be used to hold parties accountable. 
 
To discuss the first argument about the usefulness of party platforms, one must ask: 
What is the added value that a comparison between the two parties’ platforms brings? 
Even if there were differences between the party platforms of the Democrats and the 
Republicans, can the platforms influence the election’s outcome? Some scholars argue 
that they most likely cannot, because the public and the media do not pay attention to 
them (Disalvo & Ceaser, 2016). However, an exception proves the rule. Maisel (1994) 
argues that the platforms did play a role in the 1992 presidential elections. He writes 
that the 1992 Democratic and Republican party platforms were so different from each 
other that even the press noticed. 
 
The second argument about the usefulness of party platforms is that through them, it is 
possible to detect ideological change and internal conflicts within the parties (Azari & 
Engel, 2007; Disalvo & Ceaser, 2016). In their article, Azari and Engel (2007) focus on 
intraparty ideological change. They argue that intraparty ideological change is an elite-
driven process that is caused by power struggles between the parties’ internal factions. 
In more detail, they claim that ideological change can appear in the party platforms in 
two ways: through issue position and through issue emphasis. 
 
Azari and Engel (2007) say that changes in issue positions from one platform to another 
are easy to detect: the policy recommendations for a specific issue is different in one 
platform compared to the other. Furthermore, they define issue emphasis as a more 
subtle process. At its simplest, it can mean that something new has been added to the 
platform or something has been removed from it. However, it can also mean that parties 
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have made changes in their priorities over issues that are handled in more than one party 
platform. Issue emphasis can appear through both the order in which the issues are 
presented and the length of their description in the platform. To summarize, if a plank of 
text in a party platform is changed from the previous party platform, it means that 
attention has been devoted to that issue. 
 
Stein (2016) agrees with Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) on the fact that intra-party debates 
and ideological change could be detected in the drafting process of the 2016 party 
platforms. Yet, the scholars doubt if ideological shifts have any concrete consequences 
since the party platform is not a binding document. Khimm (2012) writes that the 
candidate can choose which policies they will agree with and which they will ignore. 
She argues that sometimes the candidate may abandon their party’s official policy 
position in order to appeal to the more moderate electorate. 
 
However, Khimm (2012) continues that usually the candidate does not deliberately pose 
themself against the party’s policies. The possible inconsistency between the 
candidate’s and the party platform’s policies depends on the nature of the platform 
drafting process. Even though the party platform has become more candidate centered, 
it is still more or less a compromise made by party leaders, party activists and the 
nominee’s campaign staff. 
 
The third argument about the usefulness of party platforms is that they contain promises 
that create expectations about future policies (Azari & Engel, 2007). Payne (2013) 
agrees and claims that the promises made in the party platforms matter. To provide 
evidence, he analyzed Democratic and Republican party platforms from 1980 until 
2004. He identified every concrete pledge in the platforms and compared them to the 
votes taken in the Congress. Payne discovered that the parties voted in line with their 
promises more than 80 percent of the time. He compared the result to a study that had 
used the same criteria in an analysis of party platforms between 1944 and 1976. The 
surprising result was that the consistency between promises and voting had increased 
over time. In the pre-1980 era, the members of Congress had only voted consistently 
with the platforms about 66 percent of the time. 
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Finally, the dilemma of the unpopularity of party platforms persists. What is their 
relevancy if even the candidates or party leaders, let alone the electorate, do not bother 
to familiarize themselves with the documents? Khimm (2012) argues that there are 
people who still care about the contents of party platforms. These people are party 
activists and interest groups. For them, party platforms are a part of the political 
apparatus, in that they are official party documents that contain promises in black-and-
white. As part of their lobbying strategy, party factions and interest groups try to 
influence the contents of the party platforms to gain more foothold for their specific 
policy ambitions within the parties. 
 
In conclusion, the discussion about party platforms and their usefulness is twofold. On 
one hand, party platforms have lost their significance over time; they are not binding 
documents, and most people will never read them. On the other hand, party platforms 
are the most important documents that the parties produce. They are useful when 
someone wants to compare the parties and their agendas with each other or to 
investigate internal ideological change within a party over time. Even though the party 
platforms are not binding, politicians tend to vote in accordance with them in the 
Congress. Finally, there are people who are interested in the party platforms: party 
activists, interest groups, and some political scientists. 
 
3.2 Ideological Differences in the Party Platforms 
 
Political science scholars have used American party platforms as data in their research 
on party ideologies and partisan differences. Gerring (1998) argues that the study of 
party ideologies is the essence of political science. He continues that because political 
parties are key political players, research on their most important documents, the party 
platforms, reveals the values and attitudes that form the foundations of politics. In his 
extensive study of party platforms from 1828 to 1996, Gerring observes that American 
parties have distinct ideologies and policy positions that are apparent in the party 
platforms across decades. Moreover, Gerring pays attention to the ideological change 
within a party over time that is demonstrated in the party platforms. 
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Kidd (2008) says that traditionally, during elections, media attention and scholars have 
focused on individual candidates and their speeches. He chose party platforms as his 
data because he wanted to provide a new angle in electoral research. In his article, Kidd 
examines the relative left-right ideological position of the Republicans and Democrats 
on domestic policy. His dataset consists of the national party platforms of the 1996, 
2000, and 2004 presidential elections. As a method, he applies a computerized word 
scoring technique. 
 
Kidd’s (2008) hypothesis is that the Democratic and Republican parties’ positions on 
general social and economic issues are similar. The hypothesis is based on the “Median 
Voter Theorem” that assumes that most voters are moderates. The theorem argues that 
the parties are driven to adopt policies close to the median point of the ideological 
continuum to attract as many voters as possible. As a result of the theorem, the 
platforms are likely to resemble each other ideologically. 
 
In his article, Kidd (2008) argues that the “Median Voter Theorem” holds true. Even 
though the platforms show that some ideological differences in domestic policy exist 
between the parties, the ideological gap appears to get smaller in the time period from 
the 1996 elections to the 2004 elections. However, he discovered changes in the 
intraparty ideologies as well. Between 1996 and 2004, both the Democratic and the 
Republican party had moved ideologically towards the left side. 
 
In contrast to Kidd (2008), Coffey (2011) argues that ideological differences between 
parties are apparent in party platforms. He accuses Kidd of missing some of the content 
of the platforms because he used the computerized word scoring method. According to 
Coffey, the computerized method provides reliable but not necessarily valid results. In 
his analysis of state level party platforms from elections between 2000 and 2004, 
Coffey (2011) uses qualitative content analysis to investigate the ideological differences 
in domestic policy. To increase the validity of the analysis, he reviewed every coded 
sentence manually. 
 
Coffey (2011) argues that the results of his study prove that the Median Voter Theorem 
does not apply to party platforms. He discovered significant ideological differences 
between the Democrats’ and Republicans’ party platforms. Additionally, the platforms 
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seemed to be centrifugal: they pushed each other into the opposing ends of the 
ideological continuum.  The more liberal the Democratic party platform, the more 
conservative the Republican party platform. 
 
Hence, Coffey’s discovery is contradictory to the Median Voter Theorem. Finally, 
Coffey argues that this ideological polarization between the party platforms exists 
because they are written by the party activists. Coffey claims that the active party 
members often have the most extreme opinions that are thus reflected in the platforms. 
Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) agree with Coffey that differences between 
two parties can be detected in party platforms. In their study, they discovered that 
American national party platforms are nearly as distinct from each other as many 
manifestos in European party systems. 
 
Finally, Simas and Evans (2011) have investigated whether American people can link 
party platforms to presidential candidates’ policy positions. Their aim was to show that 
party platforms matter even in the era of candidate-centered elections. Simas and Evans 
are realistic and admit that few voters read the party platforms from cover to cover. 
Nonetheless, they argue that the content of the platform is reflected in the party’s 
presidential campaign. Yet sometimes the presidential candidate disagrees with some of 
the details in the platform because the platform is a product of intraparty compromise. 
All in all, Simas and Evans (2011) found that people can identify the connection 
between the party platform and the party’s presidential campaign. They conclude that 
the voters’ attention to party platforms depends on their level of education and interest 
in politics. 
 
3.3 How Party Platforms Are Written 
 
The procedure of platform writing depends on the party rules. Therefore, the platform 
writing process is different among the Democrats and the Republicans. Maisel (1994) 
characterizes the difference by saying that the Democrats give more role to the national 
party elite, whereas the Republicans give more autonomy to the state and local party 
organizations. Besides, the process of platform writing has changed within the parties 
over time. In this section, the procedures behind the 1992 and 2016 party platforms are 
26 
 
outlined in more detail. These party platforms were chosen as examples because their 
writing processes and outcomes highlight the inter-party and intra-party differences. 
 
As a case in point of inter-party differences, Maisel (1994) writes that the 1992 
Democratic and Republican party platforms were so different from each other that even 
the press noticed it. Maisel is confident that the 1992 Republican party platform was so 
conservative that it isolated the more moderate voters. Thus, it hurt the campaign of the 
incumbent President George H. Bush. According to Maisel, this impression was 
reaffirmed by journalists who wrote that the Republican party had been taken over by 
the religious right wing. Furthermore, Maisel argues that the 1992 Democratic party 
platform was skillfully crafted by the centralist staff of the Bill Clinton campaign. The 
successful goal of the campaign was to appeal to the more moderate voters by 
abandoning the most liberal rhetoric of the past platforms. 
 
Additionally, Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) and Stein (2016) argue that the 2016 party 
platforms also show an example of intra-party ideological change. They claim that the 
2016 party platforms have the most contested drafting processes of this century behind 
them. This was caused by the ideological differences between primary candidates and 
the parties. First, Disalvo and Ceaser suggest that the runner-up Democratic primary 
candidate Bernie Sanders succeeded in moving the Democratic party platform 
ideologically to the left. Second, they argue that the Republican party platform shows 
that the policy positions of the Republican nominee Donald Trump are at odds with 
some of the traditional conservative policies. According to them, the Republican party 
has used the party platform to signal the distance between them and the nominee 
Donald Trump.  
 
3.3.1 The 1992 “Candidate-Centered” Party Platforms 
 
The 1992 party platform processes are presented by Maisel (1994). What was common 
for both parties was that the process was divided into three stages. The party staff wrote 
the first draft. Then, one or more subdivisions of the Platform Committee edited the 
second draft. The Democrats had one Drafting Committee at that stage, whereas the 
Republicans divided the platform draft into policy sections and went through them in 
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the many subcommittees of the Republican Committee on Resolutions. Finally, the 
Platform Committees of the respective parties composed the final drafts of the party 
platforms that were adopted by respective national conventions without amendments. 
 
In 1992, the Republican Platform Committee, officially called the Committee on 
Resolutions, was comprised of seven chairpersons and 107 delegates from the American 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, one man and one woman from each, 
and one male delegate from each smaller territory. The leaders of the Platform 
Committee were appointed by the Bush-Quayle re-election committee. Maisel (1994) 
writes that as an attempt to please the conservative wing of the party, the committee 
leaders were chosen among the most conservative Republicans. Because incumbent 
President Bush faced no opposition in the primaries, all committee members were 
officially his delegates. Even though most of them were prominent politicians in their 
states, Maisel claims that some states had appointed one-issue-activists. As a result, 
Maisel argues that the Republican party platform became more conservative than 
President Bush would have been comfortable with. 
 
The platform writing process was divided into three steps. The process began with the 
Republican party staff preparing a working paper. One week before the national 
convention, this draft platform was presented to six subcommittees that each handled 
one policy area. Maisel (1994) writes that there was not much debate about the contents. 
He speculates if it was because the members of the subcommittees were so homogenous 
when it comes to gender and ideology. Immediately after the subcommittees had 
finished their work, the full committee meeting took place. The final platform was 
adopted by the full national convention without debate or amendments. 
 
In the 1992 platform writing process, Maisel (1994) writes, the Democrats appointed 
party centrists as chairpersons, co-chairs and vice chairs of the Party Platform 
Committee so that the platform would become as moderate as possible. The group of 
chairs deliberately reflected the diversity and values of the Democratic party by having 
equal number of men and women, as well as some racial minorities. The chairpersons 
were of high political profile from around the country, but Maisel says that their role 
was rather symbolic. 
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In addition to the chairpersons, the Democratic Platform Committee consisted of 161 
delegates who represented states and territories according to population and Democratic 
strength, and of 25 party leaders and elected officials who were state party elite, 
congressional leadership, major party donors and representatives of specific groups 
close to the Democratic ideology. However, Maisel (1994) adds that the official 
Platform Committee only had one day to go through the party platform. Therefore, the 
real influence on the contents of the platform had taken place in the earlier stages. 
 
The platform writing process started with mainly people from the Clinton campaign 
staff preparing a working paper to structure the discussion of the Drafting Committee, a 
sub-committee of the Platform Committee. One half of the Drafting Committee 
consisted of members and supporters of the Clinton campaign, and the other half 
consisted of the representatives of groups important to the party. Maisel (1994) argues 
that the dominance of the Clinton campaign staff at the drafting stage was crucial for the 
outcome of the platform. 
 
Maisel (1994) accuses the party platform writing processes of being democratic only by 
appearance, not in reality. He provides two reasons: the lack of debate about the 
contents and the closedness of the platform process. First, Maisel writes that there were 
no real battles about the contents of the party platforms. He argues that the lack of 
debate can be attributed to who oversaw writing the party platforms: the staffs of the 
presidential nominees. Because they had the majority during the whole process, any 
opposing factions had no chance in getting their suggestions through. As Maisel 
summarizes the results: the 1992 party platforms were candidate-centered party 
platforms. Disappointed, he concludes that the party platforms were an evidence that 
parties exist to win the presidential elections, not to advance policy goals. 
 
Second, the closedness of the party platform process has been criticized by both Maisel 
(1994) and Porter (2013). Before preparing the initial draft of the party platform, both 
parties held one or more hearings of stakeholders. Nonetheless, Maisel (1994) argues 
that the hearing phase is only ceremonial. It provides interest groups that are close to the 
respective party an opportunity to be heard, but Maisel claims that they have no 
significant impact on the content of the platform. 
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Between 1992 and 2012, nothing had changed when it comes to perceived lack of 
democracy in the platform writing process. Porter (2013) argues that because ordinary 
party members nowadays can have a say on who the candidate is through the primaries, 
they should get a say on what the candidate’s agenda is through a more open platform 
writing process. He speculates that an open query for registered party members on 
policy matters, the results of which would guide the platform writing process, could 
attract more public attention to the finished platform documents as well. Porter 
concludes that an institutionalized role for ordinary people in the platform writing 
process could increase levels of democratic participation, make parties more 
accountable to their members, and reshape their policy agendas in fresh ways. 
 
Victor and Reinhardt (2018) have investigated the role of interest groups in the platform 
writing process in more detail. Their analysis compares the contents of interest group 
testimonies to the contents of Democratic and Republican party platforms of 1996, 
2000, and 2004. The results show that the interest groups’ positions were reflected in 
party platforms if the groups were ideologically proximate to party median policies and 
if the groups displayed party loyalty. The richness or lack of resources of the interest 
groups had no significant effect. One can argue that the results were not surprising. If 
the policy positions of a party and an interest group are similar, it is likely that the 
position would have ended up in the party platform regardless of the participation of the 
interest group in the hearings. 
 
3.3.2 How the 2016 Party Platforms Reveal Intra-Party Tensions 
 
In their article, Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) report that the context of the 2016 party 
platform writing was inflamed with intra-party conflicts in both parties. They argue that 
because of those tensions, the platform processes were the most interesting ones that 
had taken place in many decades. In this section, the circumstances behind the 2016 
party platforms are presented. 
 
In 2016, the Republican Platform Committee had expanded its size to 112 delegates – 
one man and one woman from each of the states, territories, and the District of 
Columbia. Similar to how it was in 1992, each state determines on its own how to 
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choose the two delegates. This time, however, the Republicans strived to make the 
platform writing process more inclusive. Volunteers and Platform Committee staff held 
hearings for groups and individuals. What is more, Republicans around the country 
were given an opportunity to have a say on the policy positions of the platform through 
an online portal (Roarty, 2016). The vision of Porter (2013) had become true, even 
though the results of the query were not binding to the party. 
 
However, the 2016 circumstances around the Republican national convention were 
extraordinary. Until June 2016, it seemed that there might be more than one candidate 
running for the nomination in a contested convention. However, after a long and nasty 
primary season, one candidate had emerged as the winner: Donald Trump. What was 
problematic for the Republican party, was that the policy positions of Donald Trump 
and the traditional positions of the Republican party were different in many regards, for 
example in international trade and American involvement in NATO. 
 
Roarty (2016) describes the dilemma: Usually, the presidential nominee is a “calming 
influence” over the platform writing process. Typically, many if not most of the 
Platform Committee members are supporters of the nominee and strive to alter the 
contents of the platform to suit the opinions of the nominee. However, in 2016, it was 
likely that the Republican party platform would have different policy positions than the 
party’s presidential nominee. 
 
Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) write that many notable Republicans even hoped that the 
party platform would put some distance between the party’s nominee and them and the 
party as such. The two scholars conclude that the 2016 Republican party platform ended 
up being a compromise between traditional conservative policies and the policy 
positions of their nominee, Donald Trump. Republican candidates on state and local 
level had the opportunity to run based on the party’s long-established policies, even 
though the platform conceded to Trump on some positions, such as the wall at the 
Mexican border, and restrictions on free trade.  
 
In a similar fashion to the Republicans, the Democrats had also paid attention to making 
the platform process more democratic. For the first time, they held a series of events 
across the country to discuss their policy positions, and thousands of registered 
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Democrats participated through videos and written statements. Even though the 
primaries of the Democrats were not as dramatic as on the Republican side, serious 
contest took place between the party nominee Hillary Clinton and the runner-up Bernie 
Sanders. Because of that, the Platform Drafting Committee comprised of appointees 
from both campaigns. 
 
Disalvo and Ceaser (2016) write that the unforeseen success of Sanders in the primary 
elections created pressure about the contents of both the Clinton campaign and the party 
platform. Even though Sanders lost the nomination, he and his expanded group of 
followers insisted that the platform be the most progressive Democratic platform in 
history. The Sanders campaign succeeded in their quest: Disalvo and Ceaser write that 
the final platform contained many leftist elements of the Sanders campaign especially in 
economic policy. 
 
In conclusion, the elections of 2016 showed that party platforms still have the ability to 
become an interesting part of the presidential election campaign. Disalvo and Ceaser 
(2016) argue that the platform writing processes were revealing of the political climate 
as a whole. The party platforms became pieces of evidence of intra-party conflicts. 
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4 The Qualitative Content Analysis Method 
 
This chapter begins with introducing the qualitative content analysis method. In 
addition, the special characteristics and steps of the qualitative content analysis are 
explained. The last sub-chapter explains how the method is implemented in this thesis. 
The process of constructing the coding frame as well as an outline of the coding frame 
are presented. 
 
Schreier (2012) characterizes qualitative content analysis as a systematic method that 
describes and presents a structure of the analyzed data by classifying the contents into 
categories of a coding frame. In this thesis, qualitative content analysis is used as a 
method for studying the Democrats’ and Republicans’ policies towards Europe in their 
party platforms. Qualitative content analysis is well suited for this purpose as it supports 
research questions that are descriptive and comparative in nature (Schreier 2012). 
 
Traditionally, the concept content analysis has referred to quantitative content analysis. 
However, Mayring (2000) writes that the solely quantitative dimension was contested in 
1952 by Siegfried Kracauer. He argues that the importance of different meanings in a 
text could not be judged purely based on the frequency of their appearance. Often, 
meaning is complex and context-dependent, and some important aspects of a meaning 
can appear only once in a text. Therefore, qualitative content analysis is needed to grasp 
these dimensions. 
 
When it comes to the reasons for choosing this method for the thesis, Kracauer’s 
arguments about the virtues of qualitative content analysis play an important role. 
Content analysis in general is a useful tool to systematically analyze in what contexts 
Europe has been mentioned in the post-Cold War American presidential elections’ party 
platforms. Qualitative content analysis was chosen over the quantitative one because the 
total amount of times that Europe was mentioned in the party platforms is relatively 
small. Had the time frame included more elections, quantitative analysis could have 
provided relevant results as well. However, with this narrow time frame, it is more 
useful to take an in-depth look at even single aspects mentioned in the platforms. 
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Moreover, qualitative content analysis leaves more room for interpretation and hands 
over a larger role to the broader context of the data than the quantitative approach. Devi 
Prasad praises qualitative content analysis for its ability to reveal meanings, themes and 
patterns in the data as opposed to merely counting word scores (2019). 
 
4.1 Characteristics of Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
In this subchapter, the specialties of qualitative content analysis are introduced. 
According to Schreier (2012), qualitative content analysis has three important 
characteristics: it is systematic, flexible, and it reduces data. 
 
First and foremost, qualitative content analysis is a systematic method in three respects: 
all relevant data is examined, the process consists of the same sequence of steps, and the 
coding needs to be tested for consistency (Mayring, 2014). However, one should bear in 
mind that in qualitative content analysis, “the relevant data” that will be examined 
thoroughly is still restricted through the angle provided by the research questions. What 
this means is that the coding frame cannot purely be based on concepts and theories 
provided beforehand, but that at least some part of it is created specifically to fit each 
dataset. 
 
Another piece of evidence proving the systematic nature is that the process of 
qualitative content analysis always involves the same eight steps (as listed by Schreier 
2012, 6): 
 
1. Deciding on your research question 
2. Selecting your data 
3. Building a coding frame 
4. Dividing your data into units of coding 
5. Trying out your coding frame 
6. Evaluating and modifying your coding frame 
7. Main analysis 
8. Interpreting and presenting your findings 
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Of these eight steps, the processes from building a coding frame to conducting the main 
analysis are specific to qualitative content analysis. These five steps are explained in 
more detail later in the next subchapter. 
 
The third aspect of the systematic nature of qualitative content analysis is the need for 
consistency checks. Consistency is related to the concept of reliability: building the 
coding frame and classifying the data accordingly must go beyond individual 
understanding and interpretations. There are two options for testing the consistency of 
the coding: getting it checked by at least two different coders or checking it at different 
points in time (Elo et al. 2014). 
 
Besides being systematic, Schreier (2012) argues that another important characteristic 
of qualitative content analysis is that it is flexible. The flexibility means that the coding 
frame is always tailored to the specific traits of the specific data. This data-driven nature 
of qualitative content analysis increases the validity of the research. The coding frame is 
valid if it captures what it is supposed to capture in the data. Elo and Kyngäs (2008) 
point out that compared to qualitative content analysis, quantitative content analysis is 
more at risk of failing the validity check. In the quantitative tradition, concept-driven or 
standardized coding frames are more common. 
 
The third characteristic of qualitative content analysis listed by Schreier is what 
distinguishes qualitative content analysis from other qualitative methods: it reduces 
data. The data is reduced because the research questions determine the relevant parts of 
the material, hence the analysis is not conducted on all the aspects of the document. 
Additionally, the specific information provided by the data is categorized and coded 
into more abstract, higher-order categories. However, Schreier points out that in a sense, 
even qualitative content analysis produces new information. The information is not 
provided on the individual level, as is the case with other qualitative methods, but on the 
aggregate level. That is why qualitative content analysis is so well suited for comparing 
information across cases (Schreier, 2012). 
 
There are some limitations to the qualitative content analysis method. In contrast to 
other qualitative methods, qualitative content analysis is not a spiral, namely a 
hermeneutical process consisting of an ever-deepening analysis of the different layers in 
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the text. Therefore, it does not offer a holistic overview over the whole data. Instead, 
qualitative content analysis is restricted to the angle provided by the research questions 
(Schreier 2012). 
 
There are different schools in qualitative content analysis that disagree on whether the 
method can be used for drawing conclusions that go beyond the studied texts. In their 
debate on the trustworthiness of qualitative content analysis, Elo et al. (2014) raise this 
aspect of transferability as one criterion for trustworthiness. The limitation of qualitative 
content analysis is that it only describes the meaning of what is said in the data, not how 
it is said or what is not included in the texts (Schreier, 2012). To tackle this concern, 
qualitative content analysis can be combined with other qualitative methods. In this 
thesis, traditional qualitative content analysis is accompanied by an analysis about how 
Europe is mentioned in the party platforms. 
 
4.2  The Steps of Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
In this subchapter, the five steps that are specific to qualitative content analysis are 
explained. The steps are: Building a coding frame, dividing your data into units of 
coding, trying out your coding frame, evaluating and modifying your coding frame, and 
conducting the main analysis. 
 
Building a coding frame is the starting point of the hands-on phase of qualitative 
content analysis. A coding frame consists of the upper-level main categories (also called 
dimensions) that are created based on the angle of the research questions. The next step 
is to create subcategories that elaborate on what exactly is said in the text about the 
main categories. According to Schreier (2012), the coder can work either deductively 
(in a concept-driven way) or inductively (in a data-driven way). In this thesis, the 
coding frame is built inductively. 
 
Dividing your data into units of coding, in other words called segmentation, means 
dividing the text material into shorter sections – units of coding – so that one section 
will fit into at least one but not too many categories. Schreier argues that segmentation 
helps keep a clear focus on the research questions and what is to be found in the data. 
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The length of a unit of coding can vary between a couple of words to several 
paragraphs. The suitable length depends on the categories: each unit can be part of 
multiple main categories but only one sub-category within a main category (Schreier, 
2012). 
 
Trying out the coding frame means that there should be a “pilot phase” where the 
coding frame is applied to part of the data. Schreier (2012) claims that no coding frame 
can be perfect the first time, so this is an essential step in the process. After the first 
coding experiment, evaluation and modification of the coding frame is crucial. The most 
important requirements for a coding frame are reliability and validity (Mayring, 2000). 
Reliability means checking the coding frame for errors and objectivity either through 
comparison across two coders or comparison across two points in time. Validity implies 
that the categories in the coding frame represent the data. If the coding frame is based 
on theories only, there is a risk that it is not valid for the data at hand (Schreier, 2012). 
 
Other requirements for the coding frame are unidimensionality, mutual exclusiveness, 
exhaustiveness, and saturation. Unidimensionality means that a main category of the 
coding frame should only contain one aspect of the data. The main categories shall not 
have identical subcategories. Mutual exclusiveness means practically the same as 
unidimensionality except on a lower level: a unit of coding should be included in only 
one subcategory within a given main category (Schreier, 2012). 
 
The exhaustiveness requirement means that each unit of coding is assigned to at least 
one subcategory in the coding frame. This is important because of the systematic 
characteristic of qualitative content analysis: all relevant data must be analyzed. The 
saturation requirement implies that all categories and sub-categories in the coding 
scheme must be used at least once. No empty categories are allowed (Schreier, 2012). 
 
Conducting the main analysis means applying all the aforementioned steps in your 
relevant data. Finally, the results of the analysis can be presented in either qualitative or 
quantitative ways (Mayring, 2000). A virtue of mixing qualitative and quantitative steps 
of analysis is that quantification of the appearance of categories can provide more 
information about the meaning and importance of the categories (Mayring, 2014). 
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However, Schreier (2012) points out that the risk in quantifying the results is that the 
focus will shift from contents to categories. 
 
4.3 The Coding Frame 
 
The coding frame in this thesis will be data-driven, which means that it is based on 
reading through the party platforms. The coding will be conducted in the coding 
program Atlas.ti. In order to make the comparison across party platforms easier, the 
results will be quantified to some degree. However, examples of the cases will be 
provided so that detailed information will not be lost. In this subchapter, the process 
behind building the coding frame for this thesis is outlined. In addition, the coding 
frame is presented with some concrete examples. 
 
4.3.1 Building the Coding Frame 
 
The first attempt to build the coding frame started with reading through the party 
platforms of the post-Cold War era. The whole party platform documents were then 
entered into the analysis tool Atlas.ti. Starting with the 1992 party platforms, the 
sentences and paragraphs where a European actor, event, or policy was mentioned were 
systematically marked as coding units. One unit at a time, the main categories and their 
sub-categories were created. The coding frame was strictly data-driven because it was 
formed one code at a time during the process of coding. 
 
Because there was no clear idea of the structure of the coding frame beforehand, new 
codes kept appearing as the analysis advanced. Sometimes the logic of the codes or 
coding units had to be changed when the analysis got further. Some cases were coded 
one way in the earlier platforms, but once encountered again, it became evident that 
they should be coded in a different way, for instance to prevent a mix-up with another 
code. If a similar coding unit had appeared in the previous party platforms, it was 
necessary to go back and change the codes. 
 
After coding the party platforms between 1992 and 2000, the coding frame had become 
many pages long. It was very detailed and layered with several levels of sub-codes. For 
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instance, there was a main category “actor”. One of the codes beneath it was “region”. 
That code was further divided in several sub-codes marking geographical areas such as 
“Eastern Europe”. Those sub-codes were further divided in codes marking individual 
countries, such as “Estonia”. 
 
The detailed coding frame had three flaws. First, because of the several layers and sub-
categories in the coding frame, the coding process had become very slow. It took a long 
time to apply all relevant codes and sub-codes in one coding unit. Second, the 
complexity of the coding frame exposed the coding process to errors. It was difficult to 
keep track of how the different sub-codes had been used in different party platforms. 
Third, the detailed coding frame did not reduce the contents of the party platforms 
enough. One of the main perks of qualitative content analysis is that it generalizes 
complex information to reveal larger patterns. Finally, there was no other option than to 
start from the beginning and plan the structure of the coding frame so that it would be 
less detailed. 
 
In the second attempt to build the coding frame, a different kind of approach was taken. 
This time, the process began with reading through all the party platforms and marking 
all the sentences and paragraphs where Europe was mentioned. These sentences and 
paragraphs were then copied and pasted into new documents, creating one document per 
party platform. Finally, these new documents were entered into the Atlas.ti program. 
Because only the relevant parts of the party platforms were included in the documents, 
it was easier to get a bigger picture of how Europe appears in the party platforms. 
 
The draft of the first attempt to build the coding frame was used as a structure for the 
new coding frame. This time, the coding frame was streamlined so that it would have no 
more than two levels: the main categories and the codes within them. In one main 
category, the codes were named after a suggestion in a book about transatlantic 
relations. Otherwise, the categories originated from the data. Due to its data-driven 
nature, the coding frame can be said to fulfill the validity requirement of Schreier 
(2012). The following sub-chapter will present the categories and codes in more detail. 
 
Next, the text in the party platform documents was divided into coding units. One 
coding unit consists of something from a couple of words to a whole paragraph and it 
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handles one issue. Finally, the coding frame was applied to the text that had been 
divided into coding units. The coding frame had to be edited once again during the first 
round of coding but eventually, the structure seemed satisfactory. 
 
After the first round, a reliability check was done by going through the codes and 
coding units again. This check made sure there were no inconsistencies in the way the 
coding frame was applied to the coding units throughout the whole dataset of 14 party 
platforms. Full reliability can be achieved only if two persons coded the data the same 
way, but a reliability check on two occasions over time is the only possibility for one 
person. Even though subjective interpretation cannot quite be ruled out, the coding 
frame can be said to fulfill the reliability requirement of Schreier (2012). 
 
4.3.2 The Outline of the Coding Frame 
 
In this sub-chapter, the outline of the coding frame is presented. After multiple revisions 
and edits, the structure of the coding frame ended up having six main categories with 
each of them containing three to ten codes. Four of the main categories answer the 
research question “what” is said about Europe in the party platforms. The remaining 
two of the main categories help to answer the research question “how” Europe is 
presented in the party platforms. 
 
The four “what” main categories are Actor, Geography, Event, and Policy area. The 
first main category, Actor, contains four codes: Geographical location, NATO, 
Institutions other than NATO, and Person. The code Geographical location is used with 
those coding units that mention a European region, country, or city. The code NATO is 
used when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is mentioned. The code Institutions 
other than NATO is used with European institutions or treaties, such as the European 
Union, the G-7, or the Paris Agreement. The code Person is used when a European 
person is mentioned, such as the Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Serbian war 
criminal Slobodan Milosevic, or English author William Shakespeare. 
 
The second main category, Geography, contains seven codes. With two exceptions, the 
codes are named after the five European regions categorized by Forsberg and Herd 
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(2006). In their book, Forsberg and Herd (2006) divide Europe into five blocks that 
have different kinds of relationships to the US: ‘Atlantic Europe’, ‘Core Europe’, ‘New 
Europe’, ‘Non-aligned Europe’, and ‘Periphery Europe’. 
 
By Atlantic Europe, they mean countries like the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Portugal, that have traditionally had pro-American security policy attitudes. Core 
Europe consists of France, Germany, and Belgium. In the analysis, Greece and Turkey 
were marked under Core Europe because of their negative attitude towards the Iraq 
War. New Europe means the ten Central and Eastern European countries that joined 
NATO and the EU at the beginning of the new millennium. Non-aligned Europe refers 
to non-NATO countries who are in the EU: Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, and 
Cyprus. Finally, Periphery Europe means those European countries that are not NATO 
or EU members, such as Bosnia, Serbia, Ukraine, the Vatican State, and Russia. 
 
The two additional codes in the Geography category of the coding frame are Russia and 
Europe. Russia is assigned its own code detached from the rest of the Periphery Europe 
because it has such a central role in the party platforms. Besides, Russia is often 
mentioned in the party platforms in a different kind of way than the rest of the countries 
in Periphery Europe. Mentions of the Soviet Union were coded under Russia, if it is 
clear that Russia is meant – for instance, when Kremlin is mentioned. Otherwise, 
mentions of the Soviet Union are coded under Periphery Europe. Then, the code Europe 
was created because the party platform frequently mentioned the continent in general. 
Not specifying any particular region or country, and instead using the general 
expression Europe, is typical in American political and common language. 
 
The third main category, Event, consists of seven codes. Three of them refer to history: 
the code Pre-Cold War History is used for example with mentions about the World 
Wars, and the code Cold War History marks the events that took place before the break-
up of the Soviet Union. The code End of Cold War is used when the collapse of Soviet 
Union is mentioned in the party platforms. The next two codes are used with military or 
civil conflicts. The code Conflict in Europe is used for instance with the wars and 
military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the conflicts of Northern Ireland 
and Cyprus. The other code, Conflict outside of Europe, is used for instance with the 
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wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well as the military intervention in Libya, 
whenever NATO or other European actors are mentioned alongside them. 
 
The last two codes in the Event category are NATO enlargement and Disarmament. The 
first one is self-explanatory, but the second one was created after some consideration. 
The code Disarmament describes the process of scaling down military troops and 
armillary in Europe after the Cold War in a coordinated effort with Russia. It includes 
references to treaties about nuclear weapons, such as the START treaties. Even though 
the contents of disarmament changed over time, the term returned in the party platforms 
to refer to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The code Disarmament is 
used whenever a European actor was mentioned as a partner in the global proliferation 
efforts. 
 
The fourth main category, Policy area, consists of six codes. It is the last main category 
that answers the “what” question: what is said about Europe in the party platforms? The 
six codes cover all the policy areas in relation to which Europe is mentioned in the party 
platforms. The first of the Policy codes is Defense and Military. It is used with those 
coding units that mention a military conflict, intervention, or NATO. The second Policy 
code is called Non-Military Security. It is used together with frozen conflicts, such as 
the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, with the general notion that the security of 
Europe is linked to the security of America. It includes mentions of anti-Semitic 
violence in Europe or Russia threatening cybersecurity. 
 
The third Policy code is Democracy. It is used to label the coding units that describe 
American public diplomacy through international broadcasting in communist countries, 
the development of the societies of the former Soviet Union into democracies in the 
1990s, as well as the situation of human rights and free press in Russia. The fourth 
Policy code is Economy, Trade, and Innovations. Coding units marked with this code 
contain references to the development of market economy in the former communist 
countries, trade relations to Russia and the European Union, as well as American private 
investment in Northern Ireland, to name a few.  
 
The fifth of the Policy codes is Climate, Energy, and Environment. It is used for 
example in reference to cooperation with European actors to tackle climate change, 
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Europe as a good example of investments in clean tech, or the Soviet Union as a bad 
example in environmental protection. The sixth and last Policy code is Health and 
Social. It is used for references to a tuberculosis pandemic in Eastern Europe, global 
cooperation to combat HIV/AIDS, and Obamacare as a negative example of introducing 
European style bureaucracy in the USA. 
 
The fifth and sixth main category are designed to answer the “how” question: how is 
Europe portrayed in the party platforms? The main categories are Interpretation and the 
Role of the European actor. The main category Interpretation helps to analyze the 
general tone of the mentions about Europe. The category consists of three codes: 
Positive, Neutral, and Negative. The codes ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ are given only to 
those coding units that could be characterized as strongly positive or negative. If the 
coding units are neutral or had both positive and negative elements, they are coded as 
neutral. 
 
The last main category, the Role of the European Actor, has ten codes. The purpose of 
this category is to shed light on how the European actors are framed in the party 
platforms. Four of the codes are negative: Europe as Bad Example, Conflict Zone, 
Rival, and Threat. European actors are characterized as Bad Examples for instance 
when the European NATO allies are accused of not spending enough on defense, or 
when the general taxation level in Europe is considered too high. The code Conflict 
Zone is used with European actors suffering from a conflict, such as the former 
Yugoslavian territories. The code Rival is used for instance when the European Union is 
accused of being an unfair trading partner because of their agricultural subsidies. The 
code Threat is almost exclusively used with Russia when it can be interpreted as 
endangering American security. 
 
Three codes are neutral: Europe as Object of Declining Importance, Object of US Aid, 
and Neutral. The code Object of Declining Importance is used for instance when the 
party platforms contain something about the US withdrawing troops from Europe. The 
code Object of US Aid is used for example when the party platforms demand America 
to help build democracy in the former communist countries or represent American 
military presence in Europe as a necessity for maintaining security on the continent. The 
code Neutral is used only when no other code is suitable. 
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The last three of the codes are positive: Europe as Ally, Cooperation Partner, and Good 
Example. The code Ally is used in a military context: European NATO members are 
characterized as allies. The code Cooperation Partner implies a less tight collaboration 
towards a common goal, for instance with Russia as a partner in nuclear disarmament. 
Finally, European actors are coded as Good Examples when the party platforms praise 
the development of former communist countries into capitalist democracies, or admire 
European countries for their economic growth based on clean tech. 
 
The whole coding frame is attached in the Appendix. In the next sub-chapter, the results 
of the coding process are presented. The analysis shows what the codes reveal about the 
contents of the party platforms and how they describe the Democratic and Republican 
policies towards Europe in the post-Cold War era. 
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5 Research Results 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the style and length of the Democratic and 
Republican party platforms between 1992 and 2016. After that, the findings of the 
qualitative content analysis are displayed. The analysis is divided into four parts: the 
general tone of the party platforms, the appearance of the different policy areas, the 
distribution of European actors, and the roles of the European regions and institutions in 
the party platforms. 
 
5.1 Overview of the Party Platforms – Differences in Style and Length 
 
The Republican and Democratic party platforms between 1992 and 2016 are different in 
style and thus in length as well. At their best, the Republican party platforms are over 
twice as long as the Democratic party platforms. It is mainly because the style of the 
Republican platforms is more detailed. They single out countries, supreme court 
decisions, or even specific people by name. Moreover, they contain quotes from the 
Republican presidential candidate and former Republican presidents. The language is 
rhetorically skilled, and often resembles a political speech more than a policy paper. 
Finally, the Republican party platforms have long paragraphs about the Constitution and 
about traditional values close to the Republican party ideology. 
 
In contrast, the Democratic party platforms are more concise in their style. They have 
less detailed examples than their Republican counterparts. More often, they remain on 
the general level especially in the foreign policy. What is common for both Democratic 
and Republican party platforms, is that whenever an incumbent president is running for 
re-election, the party platform of the incumbent party resembles a report of the 
achievements of the incumbent administration rather than a forward-looking policy 
paper. In contrast, the party platform of the challenger party accuses the incumbent 
president of low economic growth and all kinds of failures and negative developments. 
All in all, at times it seems that the Republican and Democratic party platforms have not 
only contrasting values and policy suggestions, but also a contrasting factual base. 
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The trends in the length of the party platforms have varied over time and are different in 
the two parties. On average, the Republican party platforms are 58 pages long. Between 
1992 and 2004, the trend in the Republican party platforms was that they became longer 
and longer. At their peak in 2004, the Republican party platform was 75 pages long. In 
the next elections in 2008, the Republican party platform was reduced to 47 pages, a 
record-low in the post-Cold War era. Since then, the length of the party platform has 
started to grow again. 
 
In comparison, the average length of the Democratic party platforms is 35 pages. The 
shortest Democratic party platform in the post-Cold War era was the 1992 party 
platform with its 16 pages. Between 1992 and 2000, the Democratic party platforms 
became longer and longer. The 2004 party platform was again shorter, but the growing 
trend continued in the 2008 party platform that was 44 pages long, a record-high in the 
post-Cold War era. Since then, the length of the Democratic party platforms has 
remained at that level. 
 
The differences in the length of the party platforms impact the comparative analysis of 
them. In most of the elections, the Republican party platform was significantly longer 
than the Democratic party platform. Only in 2008, the party platforms of the two parties 
were of almost the same length. During those elections, the Republicans wrote their 
shortest party platform of this era with 47 pages, whereas the Democrats wrote their 
longest party platform of this era with 44 pages. Therefore, it is not possible to compare 
the party platforms directly. That is why the absolute numbers in the analysis have been 
converted into percentages so that a comparison would become more relevant. 
 
The comparison in percentages is relevant when looking at the number of pages about 
Europe in the party platforms. To make this comparison possible in the first place, all 
sentences and paragraphs where Europe was mentioned were copied and pasted into one 
new document per party platform. If one compared the mere number of pages about 
Europe between the two parties, it would only show that the Republican party platforms 
contain more references to Europe than the Democratic party platforms. To tackle this 
problem, the information was converted into percentages: what is the share of the pages 
about Europe in relation to the total number of pages in the party platform? In addition 
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to making the comparison between the two parties possible, it makes the comparison 
within a party over time more relevant. 
 
The share of pages about Europe can be interpreted as a reflection of the importance of 
Europe for the American parties. In the post-Cold War era between 1992 and 2016, the 
trend is clear: Europe has become less significant for the American parties. The average 
share of pages about Europe was over 13% in the 1992 party platforms. In 2016, the 
average share of pages about Europe was only 4%. 
 
In Democratic party platforms, the fall in the share of pages about Europe has been 
sharp: from almost 16% in the 1992 Democratic party platform to just over 2% in the 
2016 Democratic party platform. Only in 2004 and 2012 was the share a little higher 
than in the previous party platform, but they could not reverse the declining trend. In the 
Republican party platforms, the fall has not been so sharp. From the 1992 Republican 
party platform with its 11% share of pages about Europe to 2008 with its 2% share 
about Europe, the trend was in decline. The only exception was a significant rise in the 
share in the 2000 Republican party platform. Since 2008, the trend in the Republican 
party platforms has reversed. The share of pages about Europe has had a minor but 
steady increase in the 2012 and 2016 Republican party platforms, the share being close 
to 6% in the 2016 Republican party platform. 
 
When looking at the data about the share of pages about Europe in the party platforms, 
an interesting fact can be noticed. In the post-Cold War era, the presidential election has 
always been won by the party who had a larger share of pages about Europe in their 
party platform. In 1992 and 1996, when Clinton won the elections, Democrats had a 
larger share of Europe in their party platforms. In 2000 and 2004, Republicans had a 
larger share of Europe in their party platforms, and Bush won the elections. In 2008 and 
2012, the trend continued with Obama winning the elections and the Democrats having 
proportionally more about Europe in their party platforms. Finally, in 2016, 
Republicans outnumbered Democrats in their share about Europe in the party platforms, 
and Trump won the elections. Even though a causal relation is doubtful, it will be 
interesting to see if this logic will continue in the 2020 presidential elections. 
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The lengths of the party platforms in pages as well as the share of pages about Europe is 
depicted in a graph below. These two elements are combined in the same graph to 
visualize the fact that the share of pages about Europe in the party platform is not 
dependent on the length of the party platform. 
 
 
Graph 1. Length of the party platforms in pages, and their shares of pages about 
Europe. 
 
To conclude, the Republican and Democratic party platforms between 1992 and 2016 
are different in style and in length. The trends in the length of the party platforms have 
varied over time and are different in the two parties. At their best, the Republican party 
platforms are over two times longer than the Democratic party platforms. The 
differences in the length of the party platforms make a comparative analysis between 
the party platforms difficult. That is why the absolute numbers in this and the following 
chapters have been converted into percentages in the analysis so that a comparison 
would become more relevant. Furthermore, the share of pages about Europe in the party 
platforms can be interpreted as a reflection of the importance of Europe for the 
American parties. In the post-Cold War era between 1992 and 2016, the trend is clear: 
Europe has become less significant for the American parties. 
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5.2 Differences between the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms 
 
Because the length of the party platforms was so different between the parties, a 
comparison in absolute numbers would not be informative. Instead, the results have 
been changed into percentages. The analysis of the results begins with showing the 
general tone of the party platforms: whether the contents can be interpreted as being 
positive, neutral, or negative towards Europe. The second sub-chapter is about the 
appearance of the different policy areas in the party platforms’ text extracts about 
Europe. The third sub-chapter introduces the distribution of the four coding groups of 
European actors that were singled out in the party platforms: Geographical location, 
NATO, Institutions other than NATO, and Person. Finally, the last sub-chapter will 
look at how the roles of the European regions and institutions are portrayed in the party 
platforms. 
 
5.2.1 General Tone of the Party Platforms 
 
This analysis begins with showing the general tone of the party platforms: whether the 
contents can be interpreted as being positive, neutral, or negative towards Europe. The 
results show that in general, Europe was mentioned in an either clearly positive or 
clearly negative tone. On average, Democratic party platforms depicted Europe more 
positively than the Republican party platforms: the share of positive mentions was 52% 
in the Democratic party platforms against the share of 47% in the Republican party 
platforms. However, the trend is declining. The 2016 party platforms were the first ones 
where both parties were more negative than positive towards Europe: only 42% of the 
mentions in the Democratic party platform were positive, and an even lower share of 
29% was positive in the Republican party platform. 
 
In addition, there are significant changes in the positivity over time within the parties. It 
seems that the party of the incumbent president is generally more content about Europe 
than the challenging party. The 1992 platforms make an exception to the rule, with the 
Democratic party platform having a larger share of positive mentions about Europe. 
After President Clinton’s terms in 1996 and 2000, Democrats were more positive 
towards Europe than the Republicans. The trend turned upside down after President 
49 
 
Bush’s terms in 2004 and 2008, with Republicans being more content with Europe. 
After President Obama’s terms in 2012 and 2016, the trend reversed again, with 
Democrats being significantly more positive towards Europe. 
 
The differences are most noticeable during the elections where the incumbent president 
is running for his second term: in 1996, 2004, and 2012. This trend could be explained 
by the logic of party platforms: when the incumbent president is running, the party 
platform of the incumbent praises his policies. Vice versa, the party platform of the 
challenging candidate tries to show the policy failures of the opposing party’s 
incumbent president. 
 
 
Graph 2. The shares of positive mentions about Europe in the party platforms. 
 
5.2.2 Policy Areas in the Party Platforms 
 
This sub-chapter is about the appearance of the different policy areas in the party 
platforms’ text extracts about Europe. The most common policy area in both parties’ 
platforms is Defense and Military. It accounts for more than half of all policies in the 
Democratic party platforms and for almost half of the policies in the Republican party 
platforms. The next largest policy areas were Non-Military Security followed by 
Democracy in the Democratic party platforms, and the same categories but in reversed 
order in the Republican platforms. 
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The biggest difference is in the policy area Economy, Trade, and Innovations which has 
a more than two times larger share in the Republican party platforms than in the 
Democratic platforms. In contrast, the policy area Climate, Energy, and Environment 
has a five times larger share in the Democratic party platforms than in the Republican 
platforms. Finally, the smallest policy area, Health and Social, accounts for an equally 
minor share of all policies in both parties’ platforms. 
 
 
Graph 3. The shares of policy areas about Europe in the party platforms. 
 
Furthermore, the share of positive coding units in each policy area was investigated. In 
the Defense and Military policy, Republican party platforms are more positive than the 
Democratic party platforms. In the Non-Military Security policy, the results are similar, 
but the positivity rates are lower. In the Democracy policy, the positivity scores are 
higher among both parties. Again, Republican party platforms have a higher positivity 
rate in Democracy policy than the Democratic party platforms. 
 
Now for the biggest differences in the tone of positivity in different policy areas. In the 
Economy, Trade, and Innovations policy, the Democratic party platforms are twice as 
positive as the Republican platforms. The same trend continues in Climate, Energy, and 
Environment policy: none of the Republican coding units are positive whereas all of the 
Democratic coding units are positive. In Health and Social policy, half of the 
Republican coding units were positive whereas none of the Democratic coding units 
were. 
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Graph 4. The shares of positive coding units in the policy areas about Europe in the 
party platforms. 
 
5.2.3 European Actors in the Party Platforms 
 
This sub-chapter introduces the distribution of four coding groups of European actors 
that were singled out in the party platforms: Geographical location, NATO, Institutions 
other than NATO, and Person. Most of the actors were Geographical locations: almost 
80% of the actors in the Republican party platforms and over 70% of the actors in the 
Democratic party platforms. The next most common actor was NATO with an almost 
20% share of the Democratic actors and an over 10% share of the Republican actors. 
Then came Institutions other than NATO with a 7% share in both parties’ platforms, 
and finally Person with a 2% share in both parties’ platforms. 
 
To conclude, the biggest difference between the party platforms seems to be the fact 
that the Republicans mention more countries by name than the Democrats. In addition, 
the Democrats mention NATO proportionally more often than the Republicans. These 
results are related to each other: Republicans were more eager to single out their NATO 
allies and new NATO members by name than the Democrats. 
 
0,0 %
10,0 %
20,0 %
30,0 %
40,0 %
50,0 %
60,0 %
70,0 %
80,0 %
90,0 %
100,0 %
Defense and
Military
Non-Military
Security
Democracy Economy,
Trade, and
Innovations
Climate, Energy,
and
Environment
Health and
Social
Shares of Positive Coding Units in the Policy Areas
about Europe in the Party Platforms
Democratic Party Platforms Republican Party Platforms
52 
 
In what follows, the geographical distribution of the mentions of European actors 
between the Democratic and Republican parties is investigated. One can see that the 
results are rather similar among both parties’ platforms: Russia gets one third of the 
mentions, after that comes “Europe” in general, and then Periphery Europe. 
 
However, there are differences as well. “Europe” in general is mentioned more often in 
the Democratic than the Republican platforms. Moreover, the Republican party 
platforms mention the allies of the United States more often than the Democratic 
platforms. Both Atlantic Europe and New Europe have larger shares in the Republican 
platforms than in the Democratic platforms. However, Core Europe and Non-aligned 
Europe have larger shares in Democratic than Republican party platforms. 
 
 
Graph 5. The geographical distribution of codes about Europe in the party platforms. 
 
5.2.4 Roles of the European Actors in the Party Platforms 
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The beginning of this section of the analysis provides a bigger picture of how European 
regions and institutions are framed in the party platforms. The most common role of the 
European actors in both parties’ platforms is Cooperation partner, which accounts for 
over one fifth of mentions among both parties. Even the next four most common roles 
are same among both parties, although the order is somewhat different: Ally, Bad 
example, Conflict zone, and Object of US aid. 
 
However, there are differences as well. Among Democratic party platforms, European 
actors are portrayed as Ally, Conflict zone, and Object of US aid more often than in the 
Republican party platforms. In contrast, the Republican party platforms view European 
actors as Bad example, Good example, Neutral, and Rival more often than the 
Democratic platforms. The shares of the rest of the roles are nearly equal among the 
parties: Threat and Object of declining importance. 
 
 
Graph 6. The shares of roles of European institutions and geographical areas in the 
party platforms. 
 
In what follows, the roles of the institutions and the roles of the two most common 
geographical locations, Russia and Europe, are presented in more detail. 
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First, there are differences in how the two parties view NATO’s role. In both party 
platforms, NATO is mostly framed as an Ally. However, the share of NATO as an Ally 
is more common in Democratic platforms than in Republican platforms. The difference 
is explained by the Republicans viewing NATO as a Cooperation partner more often 
than the Democrats. The distinction between the two roles means that the Republicans 
consider NATO only as a Cooperation partner. If they so decide, they can act differently 
than the rest of the NATO countries. In contrast, the Democrats stress the supranational 
nature of NATO in a way that suggests that if NATO as an organization decides 
something, the US as one of the members will abide by the decision. 
 
Furthermore, NATO’s role is portrayed as a Bad example two times more often in 
Democratic platforms than in Republican platforms. Both parties use this role when 
they accuse the European NATO allies of not investing as much in their military as the 
NATO membership would require them to. Finally, NATO as an Object of US aid gets 
an almost one in tenth share in the Democratic party platforms against no mentions in 
the Republican platforms. This is because only the Democrats mention the NATO’s 
Article 5 and promise to protect their European NATO allies if one of them is attacked. 
This common defense clause is also mentioned in the Republican party platforms, only 
vice versa, in the context of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. 
 
 
Graph 7. The shares of roles of NATO in the party platforms. 
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platforms and Republican party platforms. However, there are some differences as well. 
In Republican party platforms, institutions are portrayed as Rivals in one fifth of the 
mentions against no such mention in Democratic party platforms. In Democratic party 
platforms, institutions are framed as Good example two times more often than in 
Republican party platforms.  
 
Third, the role of Russia in the party platforms is somewhat different between the 
parties. In general, the Democratic party platforms frame Russia in more positive roles 
than the Republican party platforms. The most common role for Russia is Cooperation 
partner with almost half of the mentions in Democratic platforms against only one 
fourth in Republican platforms. Another common role for Russia in both party 
platforms is Threat with a share of one fourth in both Democratic and Republican party 
platforms. Bad example, on the other hand, is a more common role for Russia in 
Republican than Democratic party platforms. Finally, Object of US aid is an equally 
common role in both parties’ platforms, and Good example is somewhat more common 
in Republican platforms. 
 
 
Graph 8. The shares of roles of Russia in the party platforms. 
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platforms. Republican party platforms frame Europe in general in more negative roles: 
Europe as a Bad example has a two times larger share in Republican platforms than in 
Democratic platforms. Moreover, Europe as an Object of US aid, as a Rival, and as an 
Object of declining importance are more common in Republican party platforms. 
Finally, Europe is mentioned as a Good example more often in Democratic than in 
Republican platforms. 
 
 
Graph 9. The shares of roles of Europe in general in the party platforms. 
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6 Discussion 
 
The two main approaches in the analysis are comparison over time and comparison 
between the parties. In this chapter, the results of the main research questions of the 
thesis are analyzed:  
1. How and why do the Democrats’ and the Republicans’ policies towards Europe 
change over time? 
2. How and why do the policies towards Europe differ between the Democrats and 
the Republicans? 
 
In the first sub-chapter, the impact of domestic power politics and events in 
international politics on changes in policies will be discussed. In the second sub-
chapter, the party platforms of the respective parties are compared from a time 
perspective to find out if any ideological change can be detected within a party. In the 
third sub-chapter, the contents of the party platforms are compared between the two 
parties to reveal policy and ideological differences between the parties. 
 
6.1 The Impact of Domestic Power Politics and Events in International 
Politics 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis was that intraparty ideological change over time can be 
detected through the analysis. It was expected that the developments of domestic and 
international politics would have affected the policies and ideological tone of the 
respective parties over time. Looking at the data on the general tone of mentions about 
Europe in the platforms, there are significant changes in the positivity rates within the 
parties over time. These changes can be explained by outside circumstances and events.  
 
The variation in the positivity rates within a party over time could be explained by the 
fact that the candidates were different and thus the platforms were written by different 
people. However, there is variation in the tone even though the candidate remained the 
same. The analysis revealed a clear pattern: the party of the incumbent president is 
generally more positive towards Europe than the challenging party. This trend could be 
explained by the logic of party platforms: when the incumbent president is running, the 
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party platform of the incumbent praises his policies. Vice versa, the party platform of 
the challenging candidate tries to show the policy failures of the opposing party’s 
incumbent president. 
 
In conclusion, the “incumbency factor” seems to explain the variation within the parties 
over time. This is showcased in the fact that the 2012 Democratic party platform of 
President Obama is much more positive that the 2008 Democratic party platform of 
Senator Obama. The difference is over 30%-units. A similar jump of over 20%-units 
can be detected between the positivity rates from the 2000 Republican party platform of 
Governor Bush to 2004 Republican party platform of President Bush. 
 
What is more, it appears that international developments have had an impact on the 
general tone of the platforms. First, the Balkan wars in the 1990s were reflected 
especially in the 1996 Republican party platform that accused the Clinton 
administration of mishandling the crisis and intervention. In the 1996 Republican party 
platform, the positivity rate dropped from over 50% in the 1992 platform to a record 
low: less than 25% of the mentions about Europe were positive. 
 
Second, the Iraq War that started in 2003 had an impact on both parties’ platforms’ 
tones. On the Republican side, the positivity rate rose from around 55% in the 2000 
platform to nearly 80% in the 2004 platform. The Republican 2004 platform praised the 
European countries, especially in Eastern Europe, who had joined the US as allies in the 
Iraq War. Additionally, the Republican platform triumphed the Eastern expansion of 
NATO in 2004. In contrast, the positivity rate on the Democratic side dropped from 
over 55% in the 2000 platform to less than 35% in the 2004 platform. The 2004 
Democratic platform accused the Bush administration of acting unilaterally and causing 
an unprecedented crisis in transatlantic relations through refusing to listen to half of 
their NATO allies in Europe. Moreover, the Democratic platform was worried that the 
Bush administration’s unilateral and belittling policy towards Russia would cause more 
harm in the future. 
 
Third, the dispute between unilateralism and multilateralism was to become another 
major turning point that explains the changes in the tones from the 2008 party platforms 
to the 2012 party platforms. During their first term, the Obama administration had 
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focused on regaining trust and repairing relations to all European allies and international 
institutions such as the UN and NATO. Relations to Russia were another focal point: 
the Obama administration became famous for their “reset” policy and treated Russia as 
a potential and equal partner in international politics. Having focused mainly on 
domestic issues in 2008 with a positivity rate of mentions about Europe at just over 
40%, the Democratic party platform of 2012 had more contents about Europe, and a 
significant jump in the positivity rate up to nearly 80%. In contrast, the positivity rate of 
the Republican party platform dropped from nearly 60% in the 2008 platform down to 
35% in the 2012 platform. They would have preferred continuing with more unilateral 
politics and a tougher attitude towards Russia. 
 
Fourth, there was a significant fall in the positivity rate of the Democratic party 
platform from nearly 80% in 2012 down to 40% in 2016. The main reason was the war 
in Ukraine. The positivity towards Russia had all but disappeared because of the 
invasion on Crimea. Furthermore, the 2016 Democratic party platform paints a picture 
of the Republican candidate Trump as being a friend of the Russian president Putin, one 
of the “new great enemies” of the US. Additionally, Europe was once again an active 
warzone.  The escalating civil war in Syria had also caused a flow of refugees to 
Europe. 
 
6.2 The Impact of Ideological Change 
 
In addition to the impact of domestic circumstances and events in international politics, 
there are ideological changes within the parties over time. The theoretical background 
of the thesis is based on two pillars: Mead’s four traditional schools of foreign policy 
(2001) and Gries’ five foreign policy profiles for Democrats and Republicans (2014). A 
shortcoming of this thesis is that most of the foreign policy texts in the party platforms 
are not about Europe and thus cannot be included in the analysis. Besides, the text 
extracts about Europe are not only about foreign policy, so the theoretical background 
cannot be applied to all the analyzed data. Because of these restrictions by the data, 
Mead’s traditional schools of foreign policy are difficult to recognize in the party 
platforms. However, there is enough material to point out how Gries’ different foreign 
policy profiles and orientations can be detected in the party platforms. 
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6.2.1 Foreign Policy Profiles in the Democratic Party Platforms 
 
Gries (2014) distinguishes three different foreign policy profiles among the Democratic 
party: forceful idealists, global citizens, and skeptics. In his theory, the Democratic 
party elites are rather evenly divided among these profiles. The profile forceful idealism 
is the most common, but global citizenship and skepticism are not trailing far behind. 
The Democratic party platforms were analyzed with regards to how these foreign policy 
profiles can be detected in their text extracts about Europe. Surprisingly, it was found 
out that all seven party platforms show traits of the profile forceful idealism. 
 
In this sub-chapter, the most important policy orientations that characterize the policy 
profiles will be introduced. Then, some examples in the party platforms that show how 
the platforms can be said to belong to the policy profile forceful idealism will be 
pointed out. In addition, it is shown that there are some differences in the degree of how 
strongly the policy orientations appear in each platform. 
 
The policy orientation multilateralism is strong in the Democratic platforms: they show 
respect to the US being a member of international institutions and stress the importance 
of negotiating policy with allies. Having high scores in the policy orientation political 
idealism, the Democratic party platforms are eager to protect, promote, and spread 
democracy in Europe and around the world. Moreover, humanitarianism can be detected 
in all Democratic platforms because they want to protect human rights in Europe and 
around the world with the help of European allies. Finally, isolationism does not appear 
in the Democratic party platforms. On the contrary, active foreign policy is a key feature 
in all of them. 
 
What distinguishes forceful idealists from global citizens is how prepared they are to 
use military force to defend democracy and human rights overseas. All the Democratic 
party platforms show more or less preparedness in committing military interventions 
and operations to protect these values. Another difference between the two foreign 
policy profiles is the degree of nationalism. Global citizens act for the general good, 
whereas the forceful idealists justify their actions as being vital for the American 
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security and national interest. There are differences in the degree of nationalism even 
between the Democratic party platforms. However, none of them depict the strongest 
form of nationalism: claims about American superiority over all other nations. 
 
The 1992 Democratic party platform seems to fit the category forceful idealism, but 
there are some traits of the global citizenship profile as well. The platform urges the US 
together with its allies to support emerging democracies in Eastern Europe more 
decisively than the current Bush administration had done. What is more, the platform 
expresses humanitarian concerns about the conflict in Bosnia and demands the US to 
react. Even religious idealism can be detected in the concern for Soviet Jews. However, 
in the wake of the Cold War, the platform stresses the importance of scaling down 
military commitments in Europe. All in all, the platform seems to recommend 
diplomacy over the use of military force.  
 
The 1996 Democratic party platform takes a step towards forceful idealism because it 
praises the military intervention in Bosnia. Furthermore, the platform is enthusiastic 
about multilateral cooperation through NATO and about the new role of NATO as a 
peacekeeper around the world. The upcoming NATO enlargement is another reason for 
optimism about the importance of a military alliance. Additionally, political idealism 
about spreading democracy as well as humanitarianism are reflected throughout the 
platform: not only in Eastern Europe, but also together with European allies around the 
world. Cultural diplomacy through broadcasting is mentioned as one means to achieve 
this. Nationalism, however, is a policy orientation that seems to be missing from the 
1996 Democratic party platform. That is characteristic for global citizenship: the actions 
are legitimized based on general good, not national interests. 
 
The 2000 Democratic party platform is the clearest example of forceful idealism so far. 
As a contrast to the party platforms of the 1990s, this party platform shows features of 
both military force and nationalism. Promotion of democracy and human rights are still 
key features of the platform but this time, the reason for action is American national 
interest and military force can be used as means to achieve these goals. Multilateralism 
is the foundation of foreign policy, which can be seen for instance in the respect towards 
NATO allies. What is new, is that Russia is seen in the platform as a potential partner 
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that shall be respected and treated as an equal for example in the negotiations about 
nuclear disarmament and missile defense. 
 
The 2004 Democratic party platform is another clear-cut example of the profile forceful 
idealism. However, this time it is centered around the policy orientation of 
multilateralism. The platform accuses the Bush administration of disrespecting and 
abandoning many of their European allies when unilaterally starting the war in Iraq. As 
a contrast, the Democratic party platform stresses that the US can take a lead in world 
politics but only through respecting, listening to, and acting together with their allies 
instead of going alone. Besides, they want the US to repair the transatlantic relations 
and to commit to international treaties. Otherwise, the platform has a similar focus on 
political idealism through diplomacy and military force, that promotes peace and 
democracy around the world, as the 2000 Democratic platform. It is seen as beneficial 
for both the world in general, as well as for the American national interest. In nationalist 
tones, the platform wants the US to once again become the widely respected ally and 
superpower in world politics, that they were in the 20th century. 
 
The 2008 Democratic party platform continues the tradition of forceful idealism. As in 
the previous platform, multilateralism is a key feature. The 2008 platform wants to fix 
Transatlantic relations, strengthen ties to allies, and commit to international institutions 
and treaties. In addition to conventional threats, climate change and severe diseases are 
mentioned as something the US must act upon together with their allies. Diplomacy is 
in the center of American strategy with friends and foes: for instance, uniting with 
Europe to launch sanctions towards Iran. However, military force is seen as another 
possible means to reach humanitarian and political idealist goals. As a proof of this, the 
platform demands more American investments into NATO. The alliance is seen as an 
important forum for peacekeeping in Europe and elsewhere in the world. In the 2008 
Democratic party platform, nationalism has made room for collegial responsibility. 
 
The 2012 Democratic party platform is another case in point continuing the tradition of 
forceful idealism. Multilateralism, military force, and political idealism are central 
policy orientations in the platform. An international climate treaty is being demanded. 
The platform praises the Obama administration for recovering relations to European 
allies. What is more, there is plenty of optimism around the US-Russia relationship: 
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new kind of cooperation blooms both in trade, nuclear disarmament, joint sanctions 
against Iran, and the new ballistic-missile defense system in Europe. NATO allies are 
thanked for a joint successful intervention in Libya. Finally, the platform underlines that 
the US will maintain the NATO Article 5 collective security commitment to defend 
their allies. To sum up, the 2012 Democratic party platform seems to give more room 
for military force than the previous platform. 
 
The 2016 Democratic party platform is concise about Europe, but characteristics of 
forceful idealism can still be detected. Multilateralism, humanitarianism, military force, 
and political idealism appear in the platform. The importance of sticking to international 
treaties and cooperating with allies to keep peace and promote democracy is evident in 
the platform. Additionally, American relations to Russia have become worse because of 
the war in Ukraine. The Democratic platform accuses the Republican candidate Trump 
of favoring Russia over NATO allies. As a contrast, the Democrats repeat their pledge 
to uphold NATO Article 5 to show they are committed to protect their European allies. 
Once again, global responsibility seems to rise over nationalism. As a proof, the 
platform demands the US to help Europe and the rest of the world share the burden of 
the refugee crisis, even though the crisis does not touch the US directly.  
 
6.2.2 Foreign Policy Profiles in the Republican Party Platforms 
 
Gries (2014) claims that there are two kinds of foreign policy profiles among the 
Republicans: cautious idealists and isolationist skeptics. Gries argues that the 
distribution among the Republican party elites is two-thirds cautious idealists and one-
third isolationist skeptics. Having analyzed the Republican party platforms with regards 
to how these foreign policy profiles can be detected in their text extracts about Europe, 
the results of the analysis seem to support that argument. It appears that out of the seven 
Republican party platforms in the post-Cold War era, four lean towards cautious 
idealists and three towards isolationist skeptics. 
 
In this sub-chapter, the most important policy orientations that characterize the policy 
profiles will be introduced. Then, some examples in the party platforms that show how 
the platforms can be said to belong to the cautious idealists and isolationist skeptics 
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policy profiles will be pointed out. In addition, it is shown that there are some 
differences in how strongly the policy orientations appear in each platform. 
 
In general, the three strongest policy orientations in the Republican party platforms are 
unilateralism, military force, and nationalism. First, the Republican party platforms 
distinctively point out that the US shall not be bound by international treaties that do not 
serve their interests, or by collective decisions taken by international organizations. 
Second, the importance of a strong military capacity stands out in the platforms. Third, 
there is a more or less straight-forward belief in American superiority and American 
interests over global interests in every Republican party platform. 
 
The policy orientations that vary from platform to platform are isolationism, political 
idealism, and humanitarianism. Active foreign policy is part of most Republican party 
platforms, but not all of them. Most party platforms are keen on promoting democracy 
and free trade around the world just for the general good. Some of them even encourage 
the US to defend human rights globally, even though there is no obvious national 
interest behind it. Finally, religious idealism appears to be a subtle side-note in almost 
all of the Republican platforms. 
 
The 1992 Republican party platform has clear characteristics of the policy profile 
cautious idealism: nationalism, political idealism, and humanitarianism, together with 
military force and religious idealism. The platform celebrates the American victory in 
the Cold War through declaring democracy’s, capitalism’s and America’s superiority 
over dictatorship, communism, and the rest of the world. Political idealism can be 
detected in the goal to root democracy as well as a free market and trade ideology in 
Europe and to spread them around the world. Besides, humanitarianism appears in the 
concern for human rights violations in former Yugoslavia, and the preparedness to 
intervene to stop human rights violations around the world. Another interesting aim is to 
assist Eastern Europe to recover and protect their environment, as well as to invest 
globally to combat climate change. These actions are not justified based solely on 
American national interest, but rather on the general good. 
 
The role of military force is not strong in the 1992 Republican party platform, but still 
stronger than in the Democratic equivalent. Because of the end of the Cold War, the 
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Republicans admit that military deployments in Europe shall be reduced. However, they 
accuse the Democrats for wanting to disable the military with their proposed cuts. 
Moreover, the Republicans plan building a new ballistic-missile defense system in 
Europe. Another distinction from the Democratic platform is that the Republicans want 
to have control over international politics unilaterally in American hands. An example 
of unilateralism is how the Republicans want to dictate how the nuclear disarmament of 
the former Soviet Union shall be completed, instead of negotiating this issue with 
Russia. However, a hint of multilateralism can be found in the commitment to the 
NATO alliance and their post-Cold War strategy that can be summarized as “leadership 
through partnership”. Finally, religious idealism appears in the platform in the concern 
for Soviet Jews. 
 
As a contrast to the previous platform, the 1996 Republican party platform takes a sharp 
turn towards isolationist skepticism. The 1996 platform has some key characteristics of 
that profile: unilateralism, nationalism, and isolationism. Unilateralism appears in many 
ways: The Republican platform accuses the Clinton administration of putting the 
obedience to United Nations arms embargo ahead of America’s national interest in 
selling weapons to Bosnia. In addition, the Republican platform wants the US to 
withdraw from the international ABM treaty that prevents the US from acquiring a new 
missile defense system. American interests shall dictate the relations to Russia. To 
conclude, the Republican platform states that the US should only cooperate with their 
partners if it is in American interests. Additionally, nationalism appears as the belief in 
the superiority of capitalism and other American values. Finally, in the spirit of 
isolationism, the platform demands the US to withdraw troops from Bosnia, and in the 
future only to intervene if American security and interests are directly threatened.  
 
The 2000 Republican party platform returns to the tradition of cautious idealism by 
reclaiming the need for an internationally active America. Political idealism is once 
again apparent in the plans to spread democracy, capitalism, and free trade around the 
world. The argument is nationalist: America is more prosperous and secure if the rest of 
the world follows that ideology. Military force and unilateralism are still high on the 
agenda. This can be seen for instance in the claims that the US should abandon all those 
international treaties that somehow limit their possibilities to invest in new weapons 
arsenal. According to the platform, the US-Russia relationship shall be based on 
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American interests only. The platform supports a militarily strong NATO alliance with 
more European members but stresses that the alliance consists of sovereign nations that 
must be allowed to act independently if they want to. In the spirit of nationalism and 
isolationism, the platform demands a withdrawal from the Balkans because the conflict 
does not threaten American security. Finally, the platform states that peace and 
democracy in Europe are supported by the US in spirit, but that no direct American 
involvement in Europe is needed. 
 
The 2004 Republican party platform continues in the footsteps of cautious idealism. 
This time, military force is in the center of the platform because of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO is held in high regard, especially the new member states 
from Eastern Europe. Even though the platform thanks international allies and partners 
that fight alongside them, in Iraq in particular, unilateralism is evidently present: the US 
shall lead, and partners may follow if they agree with the American strategy and goals. 
Surprisingly, Russia is no longer seen as an adversary, but as a potential partner in the 
War on Terror. As a concession towards multilateralism, the platform recognizes the 
importance of international organizations such as the UN and the WTO. What is more, 
the 2004 Republican platform turns its back on isolationism. Instead, political and 
religious idealism combined with humanitarianism have returned: Peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance in Haiti together with European allies, standing up for Israel 
and the Vatican that have been discriminated against by some European states, and 
raising concerns about anti-Semitic violence in Europe. 
 
The tradition of cautious idealism has come to its end in the 2008 Republican party 
platform. Characteristics of isolationist skepticism can be detected. While there is no 
clear demand for isolationism, the lack of insistence for international activism is clear. 
The platform is concise about Europe. Most space is given to military force, in the form 
of praise for the expanded NATO alliance and the plans for building a new missile 
defense system in Europe. Some short mentions are given to political and religious 
idealism: democracy promotion through cultural diplomacy, and sympathy for Israel 
and Vatican who face discrimination from European states in the UN. 
 
The 2012 Republican party platform takes a step back towards cautious idealism, but 
the scale still weighs more towards isolationist skepticism. Military force is the key 
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element of the platform, as the Republicans once again accuse the Democratic 
administration of ruining the military capacity of the US with their cuts and lack of 
investments into new weapons and missile defense systems in Europe. Unilateralism is 
strong in the platform: while the American memberships in international institutions 
such as the UN and NATO are recognized, the platform speaks out about how the US 
must not be bound to obey decisions made by others. Nationalism is evident in the 
claims about American military and economic superiority over Europe. Finally, political 
idealism appears shortly in relation to spreading democracy through cultural diplomacy, 
as well as in the skepticism about the state of democracy in Russia, and in the 
preparedness to use economic sanctions against Russia unless the situation improves. 
 
Surprisingly, the 2016 Republican party platform is a clear-cut example of cautious 
idealism. There are plenty of elements that show the difference between the party 
platform written by party elites, and the public campaign of the presidential nominee 
Trump. The campaign’s isolationist “America first” ideology is not reflected in the 
platform’s new foreign policy outline that claims the protection of human rights 
globally should be in the center of all diplomatic and bilateral relations. Furthermore, 
the platform announces that the US is prepared to defend Eastern Europe against any 
kind of aggression from Russia, be it a military or hybrid threat. Besides, Ukraine is 
promised military assistance in the war against Russia. These elements of 
humanitarianism and political idealism were lacking in the campaign, where candidate 
Trump threatened not to commit to the collective defense of European allies dictated by 
NATO Article 5. 
 
Nevertheless, the typical policy orientations of unilateralism and military force appear 
in the 2016 Republican party platform as well. The platform urges the US to withdraw 
from all potentially restricting international treaties such as climate treaties. In addition, 
the platform repeats the claim of the previous platform stressing that in international 
organizations the US must reserve the right to go their own way. What is more, the 
platform demands increased investments in military capacity to guarantee American 
superiority and security in forms of a modern nuclear stockpile and a missile defense 
system. Finally, the platform raises some softer policy issues as well, such as 
democracy promotion through cultural diplomacy, and religious idealism in the concern 
for the treatment of Christians in secular Europe. 
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6.3 How and Why Do Policies Towards Europe Differ between the 
Democrats and the Republicans? 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis was that the parties will concentrate on slightly different 
issues, events, and actors when referring to Europe in their party platforms. The 
Democratic Party is more likely to highlight soft policy issues like social and 
environmental policy, whereas the Republican Party may focus more on hard policy like 
defense and military. Third, should the party platforms raise virtually similar issues, 
events, and actors, it is expected that because of their ideological differences, the two 
parties should have differing or even opposing moral evaluations about them and 
treatment recommendations for them. 
 
6.3.1 Differences in Policy Areas 
 
Differences in the policy areas exist between the two parties’ platforms. However, the 
platforms are surprisingly alike: Defense and Military is the most common category for 
both parties, followed by Non-Military Security and Democracy. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, the Democratic party platforms have a larger share about Defense and 
Military policy than the Republican ones. A likely reason for that is the shorter length of 
the Democratic platforms: The Republican platforms had more space for detailed 
mentions about other policy areas. 
 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis is in a way supported by the fact that the Republican party 
platforms were more positive about both Defense and Military policy, Non-Military 
Security policy, and Democracy policy than the Democratic platforms. The Republicans 
are more enthusiastic about a new missile defense system in Europe and about the 
NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Republican party platforms since 
2004 applaud those European countries that joined them in the War on Terror. 
 
The biggest differences in policy areas between the two parties are in the category 
Economy, Trade, and Innovations and in the category Climate, Energy, and 
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Environment. These findings support the hypothesis: First, the Republican party 
platforms have a two times larger share of mentions about Economy than the 
Democratic ones. Second, the Democratic party platforms have a five times larger share 
of mentions about Climate than the Republican ones. What is more, in both policy 
areas, the Democratic party platforms are significantly more positive than the 
Republican ones. 
 
In relation to Economy, Trade and Innovations, the Republican platforms see Europe as 
a rival and a bad example. They accuse Europe of protectionism and too large subsidies 
for their products, as well as for having too bureaucratic economies with heavy taxation. 
The Democrats, on the other hand, see Europe as a partner and are eager to improve 
trading relations with Russia, for example. In relation to Climate, Energy, and 
Environment, the Republicans blame the Soviet Union for ruining the environment in 
their geographical area and want to withdraw from international climate treaties such as 
the Paris Agreement. The Democrats, on the other hand, praise Europeans for being 
valuable partners in the fight against climate change and see Europe as something to 
look up to for instance regarding investments in green economy. 
 
6.3.2 Differences in Geographical Regions 
 
In addition to policy areas, there are variations in how different regions in Europe are 
seen in Democratic and Republican party platforms. In their book, Forsberg and Herd 
(2006) divide Europe in five blocks that have different kinds of relationships to the US. 
The “five Europes” are ‘Atlantic Europe’, ‘Core Europe’, ‘New Europe’, ‘Non-aligned 
Europe’, and ‘Periphery Europe’. 
 
First, Forsberg and Herd (2006) argue that the US will have best relations to fellow 
NATO members in Atlantic and New Europe. They argue that Atlantic Europe has 
similar values to the US and traditional institutional ties to them, and that New Europe 
is dependent on American protection. Second, Forsberg and Herd predict that there will 
be continued disagreements between the US and Core Europe even though they too are 
NATO members. The scholars claim that the rift between the US and Core Europe that 
was caused by the dispute over the Iraq War was so significant that it will be hard to 
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repair. Moreover, they argue that because Core Europe does not depend on America in 
security or economy, they do not have such a strong interest in pleasing the US. 
 
Third, relations between the US and Non-aligned Europe will not be focused on from 
the American side unless the European countries decide to join NATO. Finally, 
Forsberg and Herd (2006) argue that the relations to Periphery Europe and especially to 
Russia are likely to remain complex. There were signs of deepening cooperation 
between the US and Russia in the war against terrorism and in some other fields. 
However, the scholars predict that the superpower history of Russia can cause tensions 
and rivalry between the US and Russia also in the future. 
 
The results of the analysis of the party platforms are somewhat surprising. Because of 
differences between the two parties’ platforms, the results are to some degree 
contradictory to Forsberg and Herd’s (2006) predictions. The most frequently 
mentioned regions in the party platforms are Russia and Periphery Europe for both 
parties. What comes to the closest allies, Atlantic Europe, and New Europe, they are 
much more often mentioned in the Republican party platforms. Finally, Core Europe 
and Non-aligned Europe are the least mentioned regions, but they appear more often in 
the Democratic party platforms. 
 
First, as Forsberg and Herd (2006) predicted, the relationship with Russia is complex 
for both parties. In general, the Democratic party platforms are much more positive 
towards Russia, treating it mainly as a cooperation partner. The 2016 Democratic party 
platform is an exception that again sees Russia as a threat. On the other hand, the 
Republican party platforms treat Russia mainly as a bad example, then as a cooperation 
partner, and almost as often as a threat. Second, Periphery Europe receives equally 
negative attention from both parties. They both treat it mainly as a conflict zone or as an 
object of American military or economic aid. 
 
Third, the biggest differences between the parties are in their relations to Atlantic 
Europe and New Europe. The differences appear mainly in how frequently the regions 
are mentioned in the platforms, not in the tones in how they are mentioned. Forsberg 
and Herd (2006) predicted that the US would have best relations to these two regions in 
Europe. However, this theory applies only to the Republican party. The Republican 
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party platforms mention Atlantic and New Europe almost twice as often as the 
Democratic party platforms. One explanation is the Eastern expansion of NATO, that 
the Republicans seem much more enthusiastic about than the Democrats. However, this 
gap widens mostly because of the Iraq War. The Republican party platforms praise 
these regions for being their best allies, whereas the Democratic party platforms remain 
critical towards the whole war. 
 
Fourth, Forsberg and Herd (2006) predicted that the role of Core Europe would become 
less important to the US because of their breach over Iraq War. This certainly applies to 
the Republican party platforms, but not to the Democratic ones. In the Democratic party 
platforms, the long-standing allies in Core Europe receive more attention than the new, 
Eastern allies in New Europe. Finally, the Democratic party platforms devote more 
attention to Non-aligned Europe than the Republican party platforms. An explanation is 
that the Republican party platforms are more interested in military allies, whereas the 
Democratic party platforms see more value in other fields of cooperation. 
 
6.3.3 Differences in Foreign Policy Ideologies 
 
To summarize the comparison of the ideological dimensions, the post-Cold War era 
Democratic party platforms are rather unanimous in their foreign policy profile as 
forceful idealists. Being advocates for active foreign policy, isolationism is not a part of 
any of the Democratic platforms. Multilateralism, political idealism, and 
humanitarianism can be found in all of them. Nationalism is not among the strongest 
features in the Democratic platforms, but it appears there occasionally. Besides, the 
platforms have references to military force. It is the most significant feature that tips the 
scale from global citizenship to forceful idealism. Finally, religious idealism is another 
policy orientation typical for forceful idealism, but it is lacking from almost all 
Democratic platforms. 
 
It is interesting how the intra-party ideology remains rather consistent throughout the 
Democratic party platforms, whereas there are such large differences in the intra-party 
ideologies between the Republican party platforms. The Republican party platforms are 
almost evenly divided between the foreign policy profiles Cautious Idealists and 
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Isolationist Skeptics. The 2016 Republican party platform provides the biggest surprise: 
based on the presidential nominee Trump’s campaign, the platform should be a case in 
point of Isolationist Skepticism. However, the might of the party elites is reflected in the 
platform that ends up being a clear-cut showcase of Cautious Idealism. A significant 
distinction between those two categories is the preparedness for international activism, 
together with how much value the platform gives to protecting human rights. 
 
When it comes to ideology, the Republican party platforms differ significantly from 
Democratic party platforms. Between the two parties, polarization in foreign policy 
exists in three main orientations: multilateralism, nationalism, and isolationism. In 
contrast to the Democratic party platforms, the Republican party platforms support 
American unilateralism and superiority in unmistakable ways throughout the platforms. 
Additionally, almost half of the Republican party platforms show signs of isolationism, 
which is a stark contrast to the Democratic party platforms. Finally, military force and 
religious idealism appear much more often in Republican than Democratic party 
platforms. Political idealism, in the form of promoting democracy and capitalism, is the 
only orientation that can be found in all party platforms, regardless of party or year. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, the United States’ Democratic and Republican party platforms of the post-
Cold War era were analyzed to find variations in their policies towards Europe. This 
thesis provides a new perspective to transatlantic relations: the role of the parties. The 
14 party platforms from seven presidential elections were chosen as the dataset 
because they are the most important documents that the political parties produce. There 
is only limited amount of research about the contents of the party platforms, and no 
previous research about the way Europe is addressed in them. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of the analysis support the hypothesis that the policies 
towards Europe vary between and within the Democratic and Republican party 
platforms over time. Events in international politics, power struggles in domestic 
politics, as well as differences in ideological foundations play a role in policy shifts over 
time. 
 
When it comes to the first hypothesis, that intra-party ideological policy shifts over 
time, this can be seen more clearly in the Republican party platforms. The Republican 
platforms display variation in foreign policy ideology between Cautious Idealism and 
Isolationist Skepticism. As a contrast, the Democratic party platforms showcase a rather 
balanced ideological foundation. Yet the events in international politics, especially the 
Balkan Wars, the Iraq War, and the Russian annexation of Crimea, have influenced 
policy shifts in both Democratic and Republican party platforms. In addition, power 
struggles in domestic politics, especially whether the party is incumbent or the 
challenger, have played a role in the policy shifts over time. 
 
When it comes to the second hypothesis, that there are differences in the policies 
towards Europe between the two parties, the results are obvious. The Democratic and 
Republican party platforms are polarized in their policies towards Europe. As predicted, 
the parties concentrate on slightly different issues and actors when referring to Europe 
in their party platforms. The differences in actors are clear between the two parties. 
Surprisingly, military and non-military security policy appeared as often in both parties’ 
platforms. However, the Democratic party highlights soft policy issues like climate 
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change more, whereas the Republican party focuses on economic policy. Most 
importantly, because of their ideological differences, the two parties have differing or 
even opposing moral evaluations of and treatment recommendations for the policies and 
the actors. 
 
There are some limitations in the thesis. First, there are compatibility issues between the 
theoretical background and the data. The analysis was restricted by the angle provided 
by the research question, so no holistic overview of the whole dataset is given. In the 
thesis, the data was narrowed down only to those sentences that contained a reference to 
Europe. Not all of them were about foreign policy. Additionally, the theoretical 
background about foreign policy profiles could not be applied to all the foreign policy 
texts in the platforms. Hence the theory is not fully compatible with the data. 
 
Second, the qualitative content analysis method would require checks to ensure 
reliability. Reliability means that the data should be coded by at least two different 
people or at two different points in time in order to provide objective results. Because 
the coding by another person was not possible in the context of a master’s thesis, 
reliability was attempted to be achieved by going through the coding process more than 
once. However, the first round of coding was applied only to half of the dataset, so it 
accounted only for a pilot experiment. The second coding round was based on the 
results of the first round, but it changed the original coding scheme significantly. After 
the second round, a systematic check was conducted through the data and the codes 
applied to it once more. However, all the data was not coded from scratch during the 
third round. Therefore, the reliability requirement is not fulfilled completely. 
 
Third, another requirement for the analysis is validity: that the method discovers 
everything it should from the data. In the thesis, validity is secured because the analysis 
was data-driven instead of concept-driven. The coding scheme was built mainly 
inductively after a thorough reading of the data. However, pure qualitative content 
analysis alone can only answer to the question what is said, not how it is said. 
Therefore, some more descriptive categories were added in the coding scheme so that 
the tones of the platforms could be better analyzed. Additionally, in order to better 
visualize the results, the results were quantified into percentages. However, quantifying 
75 
 
such a limited amount of data and drawing conclusions based on that may be somewhat 
problematic.  
 
One could also ask why this analysis is significant. After all, the party platforms are 
ideological documents, the policies of which will rarely be realized as such in the real 
world. The foreign policy of the US is formed by the president and the congress 
together. Seldom does one party have both the presidency and a large enough majority 
in both chambers at the same time. Moreover, as the 2016 Republican party platform 
shows, the policies between the party platform and the presidential nominee of the party 
can be almost contradictory. In addition, unexpected events in the world could make 
good intentions in the platforms impossible. A case in point is the optimistic policy 
towards Russia in the 2012 Democratic party platform, and the 2014 Russian 
annexation of Crimea. 
 
Nonetheless, this thesis provides interesting new information about the partisan 
perspective to transatlantic relations. It was proven by the thesis that party polarization 
does exist in foreign policy, and in the transatlantic relations as well. So far, the party 
platforms have been forgotten documents, but now they could provide a unique 
perspective into a thoroughly researched field in foreign policy. For a political scientist, 
this information is valuable as such. 
 
Furthermore, Forsberg and Herd (2006) argue that in the post- 9/11 era, there are three 
possible developments for the future of transatlantic relations: strategic divorce, 
realignment, or dissonance. Strategic divorce would mean a permanent break-up 
between the US and Europe. Realignment would mean that the US and Europe find 
common ground and join forces over joint goals such as global security and prosperous 
economy. Forsberg and Herd support the third option, strategic dissonance. It means 
that transatlantic cooperation will continue in some sectors and with some European 
countries, whereas turbulence and even conflicts will prevail in the relations with other 
European countries. 
 
The results of the thesis support the strategic dissonance theory. More specifically, the 
party platforms show that strategic dissonance can be found within the American 
political system. First, Democrats and Republicans have polarized views over 
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transatlantic relations. Second, especially within the Republican party, there is forceful 
fluctuation between different ideological factions. An idea for further research could be 
comparing the contents of the party platforms to the policy papers and speeches by 
presidential candidates in the primary and the general election campaigns. It would 
provide information about the influence of the different ideological factions within the 
parties. Another idea for future research is to compare the contents of the party 
platforms to the actions and policies of the incumbent administration. Are the party 
platforms compatible with real-world policies? 
 
In conclusion, this thesis is very topical as we are in the presidential election year 2020. 
As far as we know today, the party platforms will be published in the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions that are to take place in August 2020. This thesis 
revealed a curious trend: In the post-Cold War era, the presidential elections have 
always been won by the party that has a larger share of text about Europe in their party 
platform. It will be interesting to see if this causality relation continues in the 
presidential elections in November 2020. 
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Appendices 
 
The Coding Frame 
 
Actor 
 Actor: Geographical location 
 Actor: NATO 
 Actor: Institutions other than NATO 
 Actor: Person 
Event 
Event: Cold War history 
Event: Conflict in Europe 
Event: Conflict outside of Europe 
Event: Disarmament 
Event: End of Cold War 
Event: NATO enlargement 
Event: Pre-Cold War history 
Policy Area 
Policy: Climate, energy, and environment 
Policy: Defense and military 
Policy: Democracy 
Policy: Economy, trade, and innovations 
Policy: Health and social 
Policy: Non-military Security 
Geography 
Geo: Europe 
Geo: Atlantic Europe 
 Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
Geo: Core Europe 
 France, Germany, Greece, Turkey 
Geo: New Europe 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, The 
Baltic States 
Geo: Non-aligned Europe 
 Ireland, Cyprus 
Geo: Periphery Europe 
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, The Vatican State, Soviet Union 
Geo: Russia 
Russia, Soviet Union 
Interpretation 
Interpretation: Negative 
Interpretation: Neutral 
Interpretation: Positive 
Role of the European actor 
Role: Ally 
Role: Bad example 
Role: Conflict zone 
Role: Cooperation 
Role: Good example 
Role: Losing importance 
Role: Neutral 
Role: Object of US aid 
Role: Rival 
Role: Threat  
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Tables 
 
General Tones of the Party Platforms 
 
Interpretation Negative Positive Neutral Totals 
Dem-92 5 10 3 18 
Dem-96 8 19 9 36 
Dem-2000 4 13 6 23 
Dem-2004 5 5 5 15 
Dem-2008 6 9 6 21 
Dem-2012 4 15 0 19 
Dem-2016 14 10 0 24 
Rep-92 10 20 8 38 
Rep-96 25 8 5 38 
Rep-2000 23 38 8 69 
Rep-2004 7 39 5 51 
Rep-2008 5 10 2 17 
Rep-2012 16 9 1 26 
Rep-2016 23 11 4 38 
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Policy Areas in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms  
(of which positive) 
Republican Party 
Platforms  
(of which positive) 
Policy: Climate, Energy, and 
Environment 
4.5% 7 
(100%) 
1.0% 3 
(0%) 
Policy: Defense and Military 54.2% 84 
(46.4% 39/84) 
47.6% 139 
(51.1% 71/139) 
Policy: Democracy 14.8% 23  
(52.2% 12/23) 
17.5% 51  
(64.7% 33/51) 
Policy: Economy, Trade, and 
Innovations 
7.1% 11  
(72.7% 8/11) 
15.8% 46  
(34.8% 16/46) 
Policy: Health and Social 1.2% 2  
(0%) 
1.4% 4  
(50%) 
Policy: Non-Military Security 18.1% 28 
(35.7% 10/28) 
16.8% 49 
(40.8% 20/49) 
Totals 155 292 
 
 
Actors in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms 
Republican Party 
Platforms 
Actor: Geographical location 73.2% 123 78.3% 235 
Actor: Institution other than NATO 6.6% 11 7.3% 22 
Actor: NATO 17.9% 30 12.7% 38 
Actor: Person 2.4% 4 1.7% 5 
Totals 168 300 
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Geographical Regions in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party Platforms Republican Party Platforms 
Europe 25.2% 37 20.1% 56 
Atlantic Europe 8.9% 13 12.2% 34 
Core Europe 6.8% 10 6.1% 17 
New Europe 6.1% 9 11.8% 33 
Non-aligned Europe 5.4% 8 3.9% 11 
Periphery Europe 16.3% 24 14.0% 39 
Russia 31.3% 46 31.9% 89 
Totals (N) N=147 N=279 
 
 
Roles of European Actors in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms 
Republican Party 
Platforms 
Role: Ally 21.5% 35 15.1% 42 
Role: Bad example 11.7% 19 15.8% 44 
Role: Conflict zone 15.3% 25 10.4% 29 
Role: Cooperation partner 22.1% 36 22.3% 62 
Role: Good example 4.3% 7 8.3% 23 
Role: Neutral 1.8% 3 5.4% 15 
Role: Object of declining importance 1.2% 2 2.2% 6 
Role: Object of US aid 13.5% 22 9.7% 27 
Role: Rival 1.2% 2 2.5% 7 
Role: Threat 7.4% 12 8.3% 23 
Totals 163 278 
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Roles of the Institutions in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Actor: Institutions other 
than NATO 
Actor: NATO 
 Democratic 
Party 
Platforms 
Republican 
Party 
Platforms 
Democratic 
Party 
Platforms 
Republican 
Party 
Platforms 
Role: Ally 0 0 74.2% 23 56.4% 22 
Role: Bad example 0 4.5% 1 9.7% 3 5.1% 2 
Role: Cooperation partner 54.5% 6 59.1% 13 6.5% 2 30.8% 12 
Role: Good example 18.2% 2 9.1% 2 0 2.6% 1 
Role: Neutral 9.1% 1 4.5% 1 0 0 
Role: Object of declining 
importance 
0 0 3.2% 1 5.1% 2 
Role: Object of US aid 18.2% 2 0 6.5% 2 0 
Role: Rival 0 22.7% 5 0 0 
Totals 11 22 31 39 
 
 
Roles of Russia in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms 
Republican Party 
Platforms 
Russia as ally 2.1% 1 1.1% 1 
Russia as bad example 19.2% 9 26.3% 25 
Russia as conflict zone 0.0% 2.1% 2 
Russia as cooperation partner 42.6% 20 26.3% 25 
Russia as good example 2.1% 1 5.3% 5 
Russia as object of declining importance 0.0% 0 
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Russia as neutral 0.0% 6.3% 6 
Russia as object of US aid 6.4% 3 7.4% 7 
Russia as rival 2.1% 1 2.1% 2 
Russia as threat 25.5% 12 23.2% 22 
Totals (N) N=47 N=95 
 
 
Roles of Europe in General in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms 
Republican Party 
Platforms 
Europe as ally 41.0% 16 13.8% 8 
Europe as bad example 10.3% 4 20.7% 12 
Europe as conflict zone 0.0% 1.7% 1 
Europe as cooperation partner 25.6% 10 24.1% 14 
Europe as good example 5.1% 2 3.5% 2 
Europe as object of declining importance 2.6% 1 6.9% 4 
Europe as neutral 0.0% 5.2% 3 
Europe as object of US aid 12.8% 5 17.2% 10 
Europe as rival 2.6% 1 6.9% 4 
Europe as threat 0.0% 0.0% 
Totals (N) N=39 N=58 
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Events in the Party Platforms 
 
 
Democratic Party 
Platforms 
Republican Party 
Platforms 
Event: Cold War history 2.1% 2 4.1% 6 
Event: Conflict in Europe 40.6% 39 33.3% 49 
Event: Conflict outside of Europe 21.9% 21 25.2% 37 
Event: Disarmament 13.5% 13 15.7% 23 
Event: End of Cold War 12.5% 12 10.2% 15 
Event: NATO enlargement 8.3% 8 8.8% 13 
Event: Pre-Cold War history 1.0% 1 2.7% 4 
Totals 96 147 
 
